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This thesis studies air cargo revenue management (RM) problems in spot market and 
long-term market. First, we consider a single-leg air cargo booking control problem on 
the spot market. The booking process is modeled as a discrete-time Markov chain and the 
airline’s decision on accepting/rejecting booking request is based on a bid-price control 
policy. To avoid the complexity of high dimensionality, the bid prices are derived from 
maximizing a reward function of the Markov chain. Numerical experiments show that the 
proposed model outperforms two existing booking control policies. Second, we study the 
capacity allocation problem in long-term market, in which one airline serves n forwarders. 
We propose a capacity bundling policy (CBP) to mitigate the negative impact of seasonal 
imbalance between supply and demand, and model the problem as a Stackelberg game. 
Numerical experiments show that CBP can increase the airline’s expected profit and 
reduce the risk under certain conditions. Last, we integrate the above two models and 
propose a conceptual framework for an air cargo RM system. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Rapid globalization and intense competition has resulted in a steady increase in air cargo 
traffic in recent years. According to the forecasting from Boeing (2008), world air cargo 
traffic will increase by 5.8% annually in the following 20 years, increasing from 193.6 
billion RTKs (Revenue-Ton-Kilometer) in 2007 to more than 595.9 billion RTKs in 2027. 
As demand for air cargo shipments grows, effective management of cargo space becomes 
crucial. 
Revenue management (RM) had its roots in selling airline seats. In the past few decades, 
RM has drawn great attention from both scholars and industry practitioners and its 
application in airline industry has been a considerable success, particularly with the 
proliferation of internet booking systems. All airlines continue modifying the model of 
their RM system in order to enhance their revenue. In contrast, research in air cargo RM 
is still in its infancy. Only a few major carriers practice some form of cargo RM, and 
even in these cases, the systems are not comparable in sophistication to the RM system of 
passenger seats. Therefore, there is a need to increase knowledge in air cargo RM.  
In this thesis, we propose two RM techniques for air cargo capacity management. In 
particular, we develop an optimal bid-price control policy based on a Markov model to 
control short-term capacity allocation and we propose a capacity bundling policy (CBP) 
to manage the long-term capacity allotment. In addition, a conceptual framework which 
integrates the two models to form a RM system is proposed. 
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To develop a successful air cargo RM system, a thorough understanding of the air cargo 
industry is a must. In the following section, I will introduce the market structure, 
characteristics and major problems of air cargo industry. 
1.1 Air cargo industry backgrounds 
According to Hellermann (2006), the players in air cargo industry can be divided into 
three groups: asset providers, shippers, and intermediaries. Asset providers are the 
suppliers that offer airport-to-airport transport and operate physical assets (e.g. aircraft) 
that provide air cargo capacity. They are represented by companies such as Lufthansa 
Cargo AG, Air France Cargo, and Singapore Airlines Cargo. Shippers are the senders of 
air freight. Shippers can be large manufacturers such as HP, DELL, IBM, etc, or 
companies that sell perishable products such as flowers, apparels, etc. Normally, shippers 
do not send freight directly to asset providers. For the major part of freight, shippers 
leave it to intermediaries to organize and perform transportation. These intermediaries 
can be freight forwarding companies that operate trucks to cover door-to-airport and 
airport-to-door sections of air cargo transportation. Besides, intermediaries also provide 
other value-added services like cargo consolidation, packing and even third-party 
logistics.  
Typically, the capacity for air cargo transportation is sold on two bases (Slager and 
Kapteijns, 2004): 
1. Guaranteed capacity contract: i.e. agreement between airlines and customers 
involving guaranteed capacity (defined in weight and volume) on a specific 
flight/weekday; 
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2. Free-sale: i.e. no capacity guarantee, usually based on specific order. Airlines can 
accept a booking request or reserve the space for a more profitable booking that 
may arrive in the future. 
The market structure in air cargo industry is shown in Figure 1.1.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Market structure in air cargo industry 
 
According to Hellermann (2006), it is a standard industry practice that airfreight carriers 
and forwarders close long-term capacity agreements upfront. In particular, forwarders 
order certain capacity between a certain origin-destination (O-D) pair in a certain time 
period, and resell the capacity to shippers. The price per unit capacity under the long-term 
contract is called contract rate, which is usually determined based on the negotiation 
between forwarders and the airline. The long-term contract is often signed months before 
the departure of the flight. Forwarders will decide the order quantity in the long-term 
contract according to the forecasting of the future demand. The order quantity in long-
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than the order quantity (guaranteed capacity), the forwarder has to pay contract rate for 
used capacity and penalty rate for unused capacity. If the actual demand is larger than the 
order quantity, part of the demand will be lost, but no penalty is incurred. Usually, the 
penalty rate is a fraction of the contract rate. This market is called contract market, and 
the majority of capacity in air cargo industry is sold on this market. Forwarders benefit 
from signing capacity agreement because they can lock in certain capacity in the future, 
especially in those periods with high demand from shippers. The airline benefits from 
signing capacity agreements because it can reduce the capacity utilization risk, increase 
load factor and attract more forwarders. Also, long-term capacity agreements can be 
viewed as a hedge against the uncertainty in cargo rate for both airlines and forwarders, 
and thus, successfully reduce the fluctuation of revenue in the industry. In addition, long-
term capacity agreements improve the communication and information sharing between 
airlines and forwarders, and thus, increase the efficiency in the industry.  
Besides selling capacity to forwarders via long-term capacity agreements, airlines can 
also sell capacity directly on spot market (Free-sale). Unlike contract market in which the 
capacity is sold several months before departure, the demand in spot market usually 
arrives several days before departure. Most of the customers on spot market are shippers 
and forwarders that need emergency capacity. Therefore, the spot rate is expected to be 
higher than the contract rate. Forwarders can purchase additional capacity on the spot 
market, if the total capacity it ordered in the guaranteed capacity agreement is not enough 
to satisfy all demand. Forwarders can also sell capacity on the spot market, if there is 
leftover guaranteed capacity after satisfying all contractual demand from shippers. 
Occasionally, an airline can also purchase capacity from the spot market. Airlines will 
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intentionally accept more orders than it can accommodate to mitigate the effect of 
cancellations and no-shows. This practice is known as overbooking. If the total accepted 
demand from long-term contract exceeds the airline’s capacity, the airline may need to 
purchase capacity from spot market. 
For any demand in the spot market, the transportation price charged by the airline is 
denoted as 
    Revenue , max , /w v w v sd d p d d   (1.1)  
where wd  and vd  are weight and volume of the cargo respectively; p is the spot rate for 
the type of this cargo; and s  is a constant defined by International Air Transportation 
Association (IATA) volumetric standard. The quantity /v sd   is called dimensional 
weight. If the density of a cargo is larger than 1/ s , it will be charged according to its 
weight. Otherwise, it will be charged according to its dimensional weight. Different types 
of cargos may have different spot rates. For example, airline may charge a higher cargo 
rate for live animals or precious cargos because they need special handling or security. 
When demand arrives in the spot market, the airline has to decide whether to accept the 
current booking or reserve the capacity for a more profitable booking that may arrive in 
the future. The acceptance/rejection decision will be based on the rate of the cargo, the 
forecasting of future demand and the current sales profile. 
The contract market is very different from the spot market. The contract market is a 
business-to-business market, in which airlines work closely with a few important 
forwarders who ship large volumes. Therefore, the forwarders have strong market power. 
The implication of this market structure is that the customer relationship takes priority in 
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long-term air cargo RM. An essential characteristic of a successful air cargo RM system 
is that it must be able to better align the interest of both carriers and forwarders and create 
a win-win situation. In contrast, airlines have strong market power in spot market, 
whereas shippers and forwarders act as price takers. As a result, the RM system for the 
short-term capacity allocation is somewhat similar to the RM system for airline seats 
allocation. 
1.2 Air cargo RM vs. passenger RM 
Air cargo RM differs from passenger RM in several ways. 
1. Air cargo RM is a two dimensional problem. First, cargo consumes multidimensional 
capacity: weight and volume. Second, not only the revenue from the cargo depends 
on the price, but also depends on the weight and volume capacity it consumes. With 
two-dimensional capacity, dynamic programming, which is widely used in passenger 
RM, may not be suitable to solve air cargo RM problem because of the curse of 
dimensionality. This difference has been discussed in more details in Billings et al. 
(2003). 
2. Customer relationship is very important in air cargo industry. As explained in the 
previous section, the long-term relationship with forwarders is crucial for airlines. 
Thus, the air cargo RM system must be customer-oriented. In contrast, long-term 
relationship with a single customer is not crucial for a passenger RM system, since 
each customer only contribute a tiny part to the entire revenue of the airline.  
3. The forwarders have detailed information of demand and supply in the contract 
market. They behave strategically. Therefore, the air cargo RM system may need to 
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apply some techniques in game theory. In contrast, most RM models assume myopic 
passengers.  
4. The market structure of air cargo RM is more complex than that of passenger RM. 
There are two separate markets in air cargo industry, e.g. contract market and spot 
market. The two markets have different types of customers and distinctive sales 
channels. To make things more complicated, the two markets are correlated. As 
explained in the previous section, forwarders can be the customers or suppliers in the 
spot market, depending on their order quantities in the contract market. In other 
words, the demand and supply in contract market can affect the spot market. An air 
cargo RM system should be able to take these characteristics into consideration and 
jointly allocate capacity in the two markets. 
5. Unlike in passenger RM, there may be many different routes that cargo can take 
between its origin and destination and it is largely up to the carrier to choose a route. 
Therefore, the air cargo RM system should make good use of this flexibility and 
incorporate the network effect into considerations when making decisions on 
capacity allocation, pricing and overbooking. 
6. The capacity for air cargo transportation may depend on passenger boarding, since 
some capacity for air cargo comes from the belly space of combination flights. 
Uncertainty of capacity adds to the complexity of air cargo RM and requires special 
attentions. 
Due to these differences, the techniques used in passenger RM cannot be applied in cargo 
RM directly.  
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1.3 Motivation of the study 
In the spot market, the airline has to make decision on acceptance/rejection of arrival 
demand. This decision is somewhat similar to the seat allocation problem in passenger 
RM. However, the existing RM models in passenger RM cannot be applied in air cargo 
industry due to the differences between air cargo RM and passenger RM as discussed 
above. In modeling the free sales of capacity on the spot market, the stochastic nature of 
cargo demand has to be considered, because of the following two reasons. First, the way 
that the airline charges a cargo booking provides the opportunity to increase revenue 
from the stochastic nature of the weight and volume of a demand. Recall that the revenue 
from accepting a booking request is    Revenue , max , /w v w v sd d p d d  . Dense cargo 
is charged according to its weight, while light cargo is charged according to its volume. 
Suppose the expected weight and volume of cargo demand are wd  and vd . The sum of 
the revenue from two bookings  vw dd 5.1,5.0  and  vw dd 5.0,5.1  will be higher than the 
revenue from two  vw dd ,  bookings, though they consume the same capacity. As a result, 
the expected revenue will be distorted and the decision will be non-optimal, if the 
stochastic nature is not captured in the decision model. Second, the cost of rejecting a 
cargo demand due to lack of capacity is different from the opportunity cost of unused 
capacity. Therefore, the stochastic demand needs to be modeled so that the total cost is 
minimized. There are several literature focusing on the short-term air cargo RM problem, 
including Karaesmen (2001), Pak and Dekker (2004), Amaruchkul et al. (2005), Huang 
and Hsu (2005), Chew et al. (2006), and Sandhu and Klabjan (2006). Among the above 
literatures, Pak and Dekker (2004) is the only one that fully captures the two-
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dimensionality of cargo and stochastic nature in short-term booking process. However, 
the algorithm proposed in Pak and Dekker (2004) is not highly efficient and the 
optimality of the algorithm is not guaranteed. Therefore, more research effort is needed in 
this area. A more detailed literature review will be given in the next chapter. 
In the long-term contract market, a year can be divided into several periods. The airline 
has to decide the contract rate in each period, and the forwarders have to decide the order 
quantity in each period. The demand in air cargo industry has strong seasonality. Usually, 
there will be a peak period from the beginning of November till the end of December. 
During this period, the total demand from shippers is significantly higher than the 
demand in other periods. The forwarders often face difficulties to lock in enough capacity 
in peak season. In low season, however, the total demand from shippers is often less than 
airlines’ capacity and airlines often face difficulties to attract sufficient loads from 
forwarders. The strong seasonality in demand and the relatively fixed supply create an 
acute seasonal imbalance between the supply (airline) and the demand (forwarder). The 
airline cannot charge a very high contract rate in the peak period to mitigate the seasonal 
imbalance, since it will negatively impact the long-term relationship with forwarders. The 
traditional long-term contract cannot address this seasonal imbalance, and thus, a new 
business model is needed. To the best of our knowledge, Hellermann (2006) is the only 
literature that analyzes the long-term air cargo RM problem. However, it focuses on the 
design of options contract in order to solve the problem of forwarders’ default on 
penalties for unused capacity. The seasonal imbalance between supply and demand in air 
cargo industry was not addressed and the correlation between different seasons was not 
considered. 




1.4 Objectives and scope 
In view of the contrast between fast growth of air cargo industry and lack of effective RM 
methodologies, there is an intense need of further studies in air cargo RM. Hence, we 
conduct this research and hope to contribute to the growth of air cargo RM. The specific 
objectives of this thesis are: 
1. To study the optimal control of short-term capacity allocation. In particular, a bid-
price control policy is adopted to control short-term capacity allocation. At the 
beginning of selling season, the optimal bid prices are calculated based on a Markov 
model provided in this thesis. When demand arrives, the optimal bid prices are used 
as the basis of deciding whether to accept or reject the demand. 
2. To investigate the management of long-term guaranteed capacity. In particular, a 
capacity bundling policy is proposed to solve the seasonal imbalance between the 
supply and demand in contract market. The optimal design of the capacity bundling 
policy is studied. Furthermore, the performance of capacity bundling policy is 
analyzed under various market conditions. 
3. To develop a systematic framework of air cargo RM system based on the integration 
of short-term capacity allocation and long-term capacity allocation. 
Nevertheless, air cargo RM system can be a very complicated system which includes 
forecasting, scheduling, overbooking, capacity allocation, and pricing. The present thesis 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
11 
 
mainly focuses on capacity allocation and pricing. Also, the network effect in air cargo 
RM is not considered in this thesis. 
The insights obtained from this thesis may help air carriers make capacity allocation and 
pricing decisions effectively, and thus increase their profit. The techniques developed in 
this thesis may also be applied in other RM areas, or supply chain management problems 




This thesis contains 6 chapters. In chapter 2, literatures related to this study will be 
reviewed. The topics covered in the literature review include passenger RM and air cargo 
RM. The literatures in air cargo RM are further categorized into 4 subgroups: qualitative 
overviews, overbooking, short-term booking control and long-term booking control.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the short-term booking control. We considered an air cargo industry 
with one airline. Booking requests of air cargo capacity arrive several days before flight 
departure. We assume that each booking request is endowed with random weight, volume 
and profit rate. Then, we propose a discrete-time Markovian chain to model the booking 
request acceptance/rejection process. The decision on whether to accept the booking 
request or to reserve the capacity for future bookings follows a bid-price control policy. 
In particular, the cargo will be accepted only when the revenue from accepting it exceeds 
the opportunity cost, which is calculated based on bid prices. Optimal solutions are 
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derived by maximizing a reward function of the Markov chain. Then, numerical 
comparisons between the proposed approach and two existing static single-leg air cargo 
capacity allocation policies are presented. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the long-term control of air cargo capacity. To mitigate the negative 
impact of seasonal imbalance between supply and demand, we propose a capacity 
bundling policy (CBP), in which the guaranteed capacity that each forwarder can get in 
the peak season depends on its order quantity in the low season. Then, we model the sales 
of long-term capacity as a Stackelberg game and the airline as the Stackelberg leader. 
The problem is solved under a general CBP and under a linear CBP, respectively. 
Numerical experiments of the performance of CBP under various market conditions are 
presented. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the design of a conceptual framework for an air cargo RM system. 
The spot market and contract market are correlated, and thus, the capacity allocation 
decision in one market affects the performance of the other market. We propose a 
conceptual model to jointly manage the capacity in the two markets so that the total 
revenue from air cargo business is maximized. Besides, we also highlight several 
important issues in using RM tools and analyze the implications from these issues. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the studies covered in this thesis and gives some directions for 
future works. 




Chapter 2  Literature Review 
2.1 Airline passenger RM 
Revenue management (RM) is the process of understanding, anticipating and influencing 
consumer behavior in order to maximize revenue or profits from a fixed, perishable 
resource. The research on RM originates from the airline industry and can be traced back 
40 years ago. Before 1972, almost all quantitative research in reservations control 
focused on controlled overbooking. The overbooking calculations depended on 
predictions of the probability distributions of the number of passengers who appeared for 
boarding at flight time, so overbooking research also stimulated useful research on 
disaggregate forecasting of passenger cancellations, and no-shows. Both forecasting and 
controlled overbooking achieved a moderate degree of success and established a degree 
of credibility for scientific approaches to reservations control (McGill and Van Ryzin 
1999).  
After the enactment of Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, regulators loosened control of 
airline prices and led to a rapid change and rush innovation in the industry. Established 
carriers were free to change prices, schedules, and service. At the same time, new low-
cost and charter airlines entered the market. They were able to profit from a much lower 
price because of their lower labor costs and simpler operations. These developments 
resulted in more price-sensitive customers and also a surge in the demand in airline 
industry. To survive and develop in the new environment, some airlines began offering 
discount fare product which mixed the discount fare customers and regular fare 
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customers in the same flight. To get a ticket under discount fare, a customer had to book 
the ticket several weeks before departure. This innovation offered the airline the potential 
to attract more price-sensitive customers and profit from those seats that would otherwise 
fly empty. This innovation also raised a new problem of determining the number of seats 
that should be protected for full fare passengers. Littlewood (1972) proposed that 
discount fare bookings should be accepted as long as their revenue value exceeded the 
expected revenue of future full fare bookings, which was known as the Littlewood’s rule. 
This simple, two-fare, seat inventory control rule was the first quantitative method to 
solve the seat allocation problem. Following the Littlewood’s rule, Belobaba (1987) 
considered a single-leg seat allocation problem with multiple fare classes, and developed 
the Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) model to solve it. The EMSR could be 
viewed as another breakthrough in the airline RM after the Littlewood’s rule. A later 
refinement of EMSR, which was known as EMSRb, had been widely used in RM 
systems. Other methods for obtaining optimal booking limits for single-leg flights were 
provided in Curry (1990), Wollmer (1992), Brumelle and McGill (1993). 
All the literature introduced above relied on some restrictive assumptions: 1) single-leg 
flight, no network effect was considered; 2) the demand for different fare classes were 
stochastically independent; 3) demand for low fare class arrived before demand for full 
fare class; 4) cancellations and no-shows were not considered; 5) no batch bookings. 
These assumptions created various problems in the implementation of RM techniques. 
Therefore, a large proportion of later research in RM aimed to release these assumptions. 
Lee and Hersh (1993) released the assumption of low before high arrival pattern and used 
a discrete-time dynamic programming model to find the optimal booking control policy. 
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This research work also incorporated group bookings. Besides releasing the arrival 
pattern assumption, Zhao and Zheng (2001) considered the dependence of demands in 
different fare class. They assumed that a fractional of the customers were flexible, i.e. 
while willing to pay the full fare, they would buy low fare tickets if available. Then, they 
showed that the optimal booking policy was a threshold policy: the discount fare should 
be closed as soon as the number of remaining seats reached a predetermined threshold. 
Other dynamic programming formulations of single-leg RM problem were given in 
Lautenbacher and Stidham (1999), Subramanian et al. (1999), and Liang (1999).  
Since the 1980s, network effects in revenue management had become increasingly 
significant. The expansion of hub-and-spoke system dramatically increased the number 
of customers that involved connections to multiple flight legs. The lack of seats in one 
flight-leg might affect the sales of other flights. This created interdependence among the 
resources, and hence, there was an increasing demand for RM techniques that jointly 
managed the capacity controls on the entire transportation network. This type of problem 
was called Origin-Destination (O-D) control. Glover et al. (1982) formulated the O-D 
control problem as a minimum cost network flow problem, in which passenger demands 
were assumed deterministic. This model was implemented at Frontier Airlines. Curry 
(1990) combined the marginal seat revenue approach for single-leg RM and the 
mathematical programming approach for O-D control problem, and developed a LP that 
obtained distinct bucket allocations for an O-D control problem. Wong (1993) developed 
a network formulation for a single fare class, multi-leg itinerary capacity allocation 
problem. This work provided a flexible assignment approach which assigned some seats 
exclusively to each single or multi-leg itinerary as in fixed assignment and assigned the 
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remaining seats to group of seats as in bucket control. Feng and Xiao (2001) considered 
an airline seat allocation problem with multiple origins, one hub, and one destination. 
They proposed a stochastic control model to allocate seats among competing O-D routes, 
and developed optimal control rules. Other contributions in O-D control problem were 
provided in Talluri (2001), Bertsimas and Popescu (2003), and Möller et al. (2004). 
The above literature review focuses on the seat allocation problem as it closely relates to 
our research. Due to space constraint, only some representative literature is reviewed. 
Other research areas in RM, including forecasting, overbooking, pricing, and 
implementation issues, are not covered. For more detailed overviews, please refer to 
McGill and Van Ryzin (1999), Boyd and Bilegan (2003) and Chiang et al. (2007).  
 
2.2 Air cargo RM 
The development of air cargo RM followed a similar pattern as the development of 
passenger RM. The literature started from qualitative overview of the problems in the air 
cargo industry, followed by quantitative analysis of air cargo overbooking, and then 
studies on capacity control problems. The capacity control problem can be further 
classified as short-term capacity control and long-term capacity control. The literature in 
these four areas will be reviewed in detail in this section. 
2.2.1 Qualitative overview 
Kasilingam (1996) described the characteristics and complexities of air cargo RM. The 
differences between passenger RM and air cargo RM were discussed and the major 
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components of air cargo RM system were analyzed in this paper. He also proposed a 
simple overbooking model, in which the probability distributions of capacity and final 
show-up rate were assumed known and the overage cost and spoilage cost were assumed 
known. Billings et al. (2003) compared the characteristics of air cargo RM and passenger 
RM. It pointed out several fundamental issues in an air cargo RM system, i.e. cargo 
product definition, contract pricing, short-term booking controls and medium-term 
allocations. Slager and Kapteijns (2004) introduced experience at KLM Cargo in 
implementing cargo RM system and emphasized several key factors for a successful air 
cargo RM system. Froehlich (2004) summarized several key factors to the success of 
revenue management at Lufthansa cargo. 
2.2.2 Overbooking 
Air cargo overbooking is the practice of intentionally selling more cargo space than the 
available capacity to compensate for cancellations and no-shows. Besides, air cargo 
overbooking must also address the stochastic nature of the capacity. Kasilingam (1997) 
solved an air cargo overbooking problem by minimizing the overage cost and underage 
cost. The capacity was assumed to be a stochastic variable. However, the two-
dimensional nature of air cargo overbooking was not addressed. In the air cargo industry, 
offloading of cargo can result from violation of any one of the two capacity constraints. 
To consider the two dimensional nature in cargo overbooking decision, the decision 
model must be able to reflect the dependency between showing up volume and weight. 
Luo et al. (2008) presented the first two-dimensional model for cargo overbooking. They 
introduced the concept of an overbooking curve and obtained the optimal solution in two 
cases respectively, i.e. a booking curve with general shape and a booking curve with 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
18 
 
rectangular shape. Moussawi and Cakanyildirim (2005) developed another two-
dimensional model for cargo overbooking, whose objective was profit maximization 
instead of cost minimization. They adopted the concept of an overbooking curve, but 
restricted the curve to be a box defined by two control parameters. Therefore, this 
approach was easier to implement in air cargo RM practices.  
2.2.3 Short-term booking control 
As explained in the previous chapter, customers may order capacity from airline a short 
period, usually days or a week, before flight departure. Since the capacity ordered by 
these customers is not guaranteed, the airline has to decide whether to accept the booking 
request or not according to current remaining capacity and the type, weight and volume 
of the cargo. This decision problem is called the short-term booking control problem. 
Short-term booking control problem is very important to airlines, especially during the 
peak season for air cargo transportation. If airlines can make this decision correctly, they 
can serve the most profitable demands, and thus earn greater profit with the limited 
capacity. Despite the importance of the short-term booking control problem, only a few 
studies focus on this problem. For the rest of this section, we will review these studies in 
detail. 
As mentioned in section 2.1, Lee and Hersh (1993) developed a dynamic programming 
model for a single-leg seat allocation problem. Huang and Hsu (2005) extended the 
dynamic programming model in Lee and Hersh (1993) and developed a model for single-
leg short-term booking control problem. They assumed that there were finite discrete 
sizes of cargo without considering the nature of two-dimensionality in air cargo revenue 
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management. As a result, the model was similar to a passenger revenue management 
model allowing for group booking and the complexity and practicality of the research 
were reduced. 
Sandhu and Klabjan (2006) integrated fleeting and bid-price based Origin-Destination 
revenue management approach and formulated a deterministic model that captured both 
passenger and cargo revenue for a network revenue management problem. In the cargo 
booking control section, the three dimensional capacities, (i.e. weight, volume and 
containers), and time constraint, (i.e. standard and express), are considered. However, 
they used expected values of cargo demands rather than stochastic demands and therefore 
the resulting model was deterministic.  
Chew et al. (2006) considered a short-term air cargo capacity planning problem from 
freight forwarders’ perspective. They assumed that a freight forwarder could backlog the 
unsatisfied demands to the next flight with cost or purchase additional ad hoc space from 
the airline, if the guaranteed capacity was not enough to satisfy all demands. The 
forwarder had to balance the cost of backlogged shipment and the cost of acquiring 
additional cargo space. For a given amount of long-term contract space, the decision for 
each stage was the quantity of additional space required so that the total cost was 
minimized. Then, they formulated the problem as a stochastic DP and derived optimal 
solution. 
Karaesmen (2001) formulated the single-leg short-term booking control problem as a 
continuous linear programming and showed that bid-price control policy can be used in 
short-term booking control. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that 
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established the feasibility of using bid-price control policy to solve short-term booking 
control problem. However, it was impractical to solve this continuous linear 
programming directly and thus, Karaesmen (2001) had to rely on some approximation 
schemes. In particular, weight and volume were discretized to form a number of regions 
and the demand arrival rate of a region was approximated by the average demand arrival 
rate. With these approximations, Karaesmen (2001) developed three methods to obtain 
the bid prices. It was shown that the methods outperformed the First Come First Serve 
(FCFS) policy. Due to the approximations, however, the short-term booking control 
problem solved by Karaesmen (2001) was more of a deterministic problem than a 
stochastic one. 
Amaruchkul et al. (2005) formulated the single-leg short-term air cargo booking control 
problem as a two-dimensional dynamic programming and developed three heuristics to 
solve it. They used the same revenue function as in Moussawi and Cakanyildirim (2005) 
and a linear offload cost function as in Luo et al. (2008). It is shown that their heuristics 
outperformed the FCFS policy. Compared to Karaesmen (2001), the stochastic nature of 
demand arrival was captured in the heuristics in Amaruchkul et al. (2005). Unfortunately, 
the weight and volume of demand were approximated by average values in the heuristics 
to avoid the curse of dimensionality. As a result, the stochastic nature of short-term air 
cargo booking control problem was still not fully captured. 
Pak and Dekker (2004) viewed short-term booking control problem as a static 
multidimensional knapsack problem and applied the greedy algorithm in Kan et al. (1993) 
to solve it. Extensive simulations under different demand scenarios were then used to 
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solve for bid prices and the final bid prices were obtained by computing the average bid 
prices over all demand scenarios. Pak and Dekker (2004) also showed that bid-price 
control policy was asymptotically optimal for the short-term booking control problem, 
which established the basis for the use of bid-price control policy in this thesis. A 
problem of Pak and Dekker (2004) is that extensive simulations are extremely time-
consuming. Thousands of runs of simulations are needed to obtain a stable result for a 
practical scale problem. In addition, the optimality of bid prices obtained by Pak and 
Dekker (2004) is not guaranteed since the bid prices are calculated as the simple average 
of the results from all simulations. 
Among the above literature, Karaesmen (2001), Amaruchkul et al. (2005) and Pak and 
Dekker (2004) are the only studies that consider both the stochastic nature and two-
dimensionality of the problem. Among the above three studies, Pak and Dekker (2004) is 
the only study which fully captures the stochastic nature in short-term booking process. 
However, the algorithm provided by Pak and Dekker (2004) is not highly efficient and 
the optimality of the algorithm is not guaranteed. In view of this, we believe that there is 
plenty of space for the improvement of research in short-term air cargo booking control 
problem. 
2.2.4 Long-term booking control 
Hellermann (2006) proposed an options contract for the long-term allotment of air cargo 
capacity. Under this contract, each forwarder had to decide its order capacity and paid 
reservation fee for the capacity at the beginning of the planning horizon. After the 
demand was realized, each forwarder reported the actual capacity it needed, which should 
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be less than the initial reserved quantity, and paid execution fee for the used capacity. 
This contract shifted part of the risk from airlines to forwarders. To the best of our 
knowledge, Hellermann (2006) was the only literature that addresses the long-term air 
cargo capacity allocation problem. However, Hellermann (2006) focused on the design of 
options contract in order to solve the problem of forwarders’ default on penalties for 
unused capacity. The seasonal imbalance between supply and demand in air cargo 
industry was not addressed and the correlation between different seasons was not 
considered.  
The long-term booking control problem is similar to the problem considered in supply 
chain management (SCM). The airline acts as the manufacturer and forwarders act as 
distributors. The airline decides the pricing of its product, and forwarders decide their 
order quantity in each period. The airline’s product, i.e. air cargo capacity, is perishable 
without any salvage value. These are similar to the market dynamics in a SCM problem. 
However, the long-term booking control problem has its own distinction, which 
differentiates this problem from SCM. The difference will be discussed in Section 4.1. 
There are vast amounts of literature in SCM. A comprehensive review in this area is 
given in Tsay et al. (1999) and Cachon (2003).  
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Chapter 3  Air cargo booking control in spot market 
As introduced in the first chapter, the air cargo industry can be classified into two 
markets, spot market and contract market. In this chapter, we focus on the single-leg air 
cargo booking control problem on the spot market. In section 3.1, a problem description 
and a large-scale mathematical integer programming formulation of the problem will be 
given. In section 3.2, a Markovian model based on a bid-price control policy is developed 
to model the booking process. Then, the optimal bid prices are obtained by maximizing a 
reward function of the Markov model. In section 3.3, numerical comparisons between the 
proposed approach and two existing static single-leg air cargo capacity allocation policies 
are presented.  
 
3.1 Preliminary framework 
Notations: 
n  and N --- Decision period with n  denoting any period along the process and N  
denoting the time of departure;  
nW --- Cumulative weight of accepted booking requests until period n; 
nV --- Cumulative volume of accepted booking requests until period n; 
wc  --- Weight capacity for air cargo;  
vc  --- Volume capacity for air cargo;  
wd  --- Weight of an individual demand; 
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vd  --- Volume of an individual demand; 
 ,wv w vf d d  --- Joint probability density function (pdf) of demand’s weight and volume; 
s  --- Standard inverse density defined by IATA, which is a constant; 
  --- Constant arrival rate; 
p --- spot rate from accepting a certain type of cargo; 
Prob --- Probability mass function (pmf) of discrete variables or probability of the 
happening of a certain event; 
3.1.1 Problem description 
We consider a single-leg flight with weight capacity wc  and volume capacity vc . During 
a given booking period, demands with different type, weight and volume arrive at a 
constant rate  . When a booking request is made, the airline has to decide whether to 
accept it or not according to the characteristic of the demand and the current selling 
profile. If the booking request is accepted, airline will receive revenue: 
    Revenue , max , /w v w v sd d p d d   (3.1) 
where wd  and vd  are the weight and volume of the demand respectively, which follow a 
joint distribution  ,wv w vf d d ; p is the spot rate for the type of this cargo; and s  is a 
constant defined by the International Air Transportation Association (IATA) volumetric 
standard. The quantity /v sd   is called dimensional weight. If the density of a cargo is 
larger than 1/ s , it will be charged according to its weight. Otherwise, it will be charged 
according to its dimensional weight. Different types of cargos may have different spot 
rates. For example, airline may charge a higher spot rate for live animals or precious 
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cargos because they need special handling or security. As a result, we assume that p 
follows a discrete distribution with a support  1 2, ,..., ap p p . It is assumed that p is 
independent of wd  and vd  and that when a booking request is rejected, no penalty is 
incurred.  
The booking period is divided into N time periods, indexed by 0,1, 2, ... , N . Period 0 
corresponds to the beginning of booking period and period N corresponds to the 
departure of flight. We can choose a large N so that one and only one booking request 
may arrive in one time period, i.e. the arrival rate 1  . As a result, the probability of a 
demand arriving in a period is   and the probability of null event is 1   approximately.  
A bid price policy similar to that of Pak and Dekker (2004) is adopted to manage the 
booking requests. A booking request is accepted if 
  max , /w v s w w v vp d d h d h d    (3.2) 
and n w wW d c  , n v vV d c        (3.3) 
where wh  and vh  are bid prices for weight and volume respectively; nW  and nV  are 
cumulative weight and volume of all accepted cargos until period n; wc  and vc  are 
weight and volume capacity respectively.  
The left hand side of the inequality (3.2) represents the revenue from accepting the cargo. 
Once the booking arrives, the weight, volume and type are known and the revenue is 
determined. The right hand side of the inequality (3.2) represents the opportunity cost of 
accepting the cargo, which depends on the bid prices wh , vh  and the capacities wd , vd  it 
consumes. Inequality equation (3.3) represents capacity constraints.  
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Our objective is to find the optimal bid prices so that the total revenue from booking 
requests is maximized. 
3.1.2 A Utopia formulation – large-scale MIP 
Suppose we are clairvoyant and know information of all demands that will show up in the 
future. The information includes weight, volume and profit rate of each individual 
demand and also their chronological sequence, which was denoted as 
      
1 1 1 2 2 2
, , , , , ,..., , ,
n n nw v d w v d w v d
S d d p d d p d d p , where  , ,
j j jw v d
d d p  provides the 
weight, volume and profit rate information of the jth demand; 
jd
p follows the discrete 
distribution assumed in the last section. Demand  , ,
j j jw v d
d d p
 
arrives earlier than 
demand  , ,
l l lw v d
d d p , if j l . A collection of   , , ; 1,2,...,j j jw v dd d p j n , S is called a 
possible demand scenario that may realize in the future. Based on the arrival rate, joint 
distribution of weight and volume and the discrete distribution of price rate, a brute-force 
approach in solving the problem is to exhaustively enumerate all the possible demand 
scenarios that may realize in the future. We assume that scenarios are independent of 
each other. Let        1 1 1 2 2 2, , , , , ,..., , , , 1,2,...,n n ni i ii i i i i i i i ii w v d w v d w v dS d d p d d p d d p i m    , 
where iS  denotes the ith scenario;  in  is the number of booking requests in this scenario 
iS ; m denotes the number of possible demand scenarios. For each scenario, the 
acceptance/rejection decision on each demand will be made according to decision rules 
(3.2) and (3.3). Then the revenue from each scenario can be calculated based on the 
decisions. Once the probability that scenario i will realize in the future is known, the 
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expected revenue over all scenarios can be calculated. A mixed integer programming 
(MIP) model can then be formulated to find the optimal bid prices  ,w vh h  under which 
the expected revenue is maximized. Assume that a dummy demand 
 
0 0 0








i i i i
d j w v s
j






s.t. for 1,2,...,i m   (flight capacity constraints) 








i i i i
w k w w j
k
d d c M 










i i i i
v k v v j
k
d d c M 


     (3.5) 
 
 for 1,2,...,i m                        (bid-price control constraints) 
  for 0,1,2,..., ij n  
      3max , / 1j j j j ji i i i i iw w v v d w v s jh d h d p d d M      (3.6) 
 
 for 1,2,...,i m                        (sequential accepting constraints) 
  for 0,1,2,..., ij n  






i i i i
w w k w j
k
c d d M x 


     (3.7) 
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i i i i
v v k v j
k
c d d M y 


     (3.8) 
     3max , /j j j j ji i i i i id w v s w w v v jp d d h d h d M z      (3.9) 
   2i i i ij j j jx y z      (3.10) 
   , , are binary variablesi i ij j jx y z  
  
 0, 0w vh h   
 
Decision variables: 
wh  – bid price for weight capacity; 
vh  – bid price for volume capacity; 
1, if the th demand in scenario  is accepted
0,1,2,..., and 1,2,...,













wd  – the weight of jth demand in scenario i, 0,1,2,..., ij n  and 1,2,...,i m ; 
j
i
vd  – the volume of jth demand in scenario i, 0,1,2,..., and 1,2,...,ij n i m  ; 
j
i
dp  – the profit rate of jth demand in scenario i, 0,1,2,..., ij n  and 1,2,...,i m ; 
  – a very small number; 
M1, M2, M3 – large numbers. 
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The first set of constraints is capacity constraints. If the left hand side of the inequality 
(3.4) or (3.5) is positive, i.e. the cumulative weight/volume exceeds the capacity limit, the 
decision variable will be equal to zero, i.e. the demand is rejected. The second set of 
constraints represents the bid price control policy. If the left hand side of inequality (3.6) 
is positive, i.e. the opportunity cost of accepting the demand is greater than its revenue, 
the demand is rejected. The third set of constraints ensures that a booking request will be 
accepted if it satisfies the bid price control policy and capacity constraints. If the left hand 
sides of inequality (3.7) and (3.8) are positive, i.e. accepting the current booking request 
will not violate capacity constraints, the binary variable 
i
jx  and 
i
jy  will be equal to 1. A 













   , i.e. the current demand is allowed to be accepted, if the 
acceptance of this demand will use up the remaining weight capacity. Similarly, binary 
variable 
i
jz  will equal to 1 as long as the profit from accepting the current booking 
request is greater or equal to the opportunity cost. Then inequality (3.10) ensures that the 
current booking request is accepted, when all the criteria are satisfied. Since the 
maximum payload of Boeing 747 is around 60 tons, M1 is set to be 60000, which is an 
upper bound of what we can expect from the left hand side of inequality (3.4). Similarly, 
M2 and M3 can be set to the corresponding upper bounds of inequality (3.5) and (3.6) 
respectively. In conclusion, a booking request is rejected if it violates any of the capacity 
constraints and bid price criterion. Otherwise, it will be accepted. Therefore, the decision 
for each booking request is fixed once the bid prices are fixed. A dummy demand is 
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created at the beginning of each scenario in order to express the constraints in a neater 
way. It will not affect the structure of problem.  
To further illustrate the MIP, a simple numerical example is provided as follows.  
Example: 
Suppose the capacity of the flight is    , 100,10w vc c  . The selling season is divided 
into 1000 small decision periods and the arrival rate is estimated as 0.003. Also, the 
weight, volume and spot rate information can be estimated according to the historical 
information and the forecasting of future demand. Based on the estimation of future 
demand parameters, we can generate future demand scenarios via simulation. For the 
simplicity of illustration, we assume that there are 3 possible scenarios, and they are 
represented as       1 55,5.5,1.2 , 45,4.5,1.1 , 45,4.5,1.3S  ,     2 70,8.5,1.2 , 45,4,1.4S  , 
and       3 40,3.5,1.2 , 25,3,1.4 , 50,6,1.1S  . Each scenario has the same probability to 
realize. Assume that the standard inverse density 0.1s  . Then the problem can be 
solved by the MIP. The optimal  * *,w vh h  falls in a region, which is characterized as 
* *0.1 1.1w vh h  , 
* *0.82 0.1 1.2w vh h  , and 
* *0.0875 1.2w vh h  . The optimal 
acceptance/rejection decisions are {(1,0,1); (1,0); (1,1,0)}. The second demand in 1S  is 
rejected because this demand does not satisfy the bid-price control policy, i.e. 
* *1.1 45 45 4.5w vh h   . The second demand in 2S  and the third demand in 3S  are rejected 
because it violates the capacity constraints.  
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The above example is designed to illustrate how to use the MIP. There are only three 
possible scenarios and no more than 3 demands in each scenario. As a result, the optimal 
bid prices are characterized by a region rather than accurate solutions. To solve a real 
problem with satisfactory precision level, we may have to generate thousands of demand 
scenarios and each demand scenario may consist of dozens of booking requests. Then, 
there can be more than one million constraints and hundreds of thousands of integer 
decision variables. Therefore, the MIP is intractable for a real problem. Two general 
approaches can be adopted to address this. One is to find the optimal bid prices for each 
scenario and then combine the result. The other approach is to obtain the expected 
revenue as a function of the bid prices and then solve for the optimal bid prices. Pak and 
Dekker (2004) adopted the former via extensive simulation. Here, we shall pursue the 
latter via a Markovian model.  
 
3.2 A Discrete-Time Markov Chain Formulation with Bid Price Control 
Policy 
The problem is solved in two phases. First, the expected revenue from the cargo bookings 
is expressed as a function of the bid prices wh  and vh . Then, the optimal bid prices 
*
wh  
and *vh  is obtained by maximizing the expected revenue.  
To simplify the modeling of booking process, the demand size wd , vd , state variables 
nW  , nV  and capacity wc , vc  are discretized. 




     
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wd  denotes the weight of cargo after discretization; wD  denotes the weight of cargo 
before discretization; wSS  is the step size for weight discretization; wH  is the maximum 
weight of an individual demand after discretization. 
Similarly, 
vd , nW , nV , wc  and vc  are discretized using the same scheme.  
Let 
vd  denotes the volume of a demand after discretization, taking value from  1,2,..., vH  
and vH  is the maximum volume of individual demand after discretization;  
/w w wc C SS     denotes the weight capacity after discretization, where wC  denotes the 
weight capacity before discretization; 
nW  denotes the cumulative weight of accepted cargos until period n after discretization, 
taking value from  0,1,2,..., wc ; 
/v v vc C SS     denotes the volume capacity after discretization, where vC  denotes the 
volume capacity before discretization and vSS  is the step size for volume discretization; 
nV  denotes the cumulative volume of accepted cargos until period n after discretization, 
taking value from  0,1,2,..., vc . 
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Although we use the same notations, i.e. 
vd , nW , nV , wc  and vc , we refer to the weight 
and volume after discretization in the remainder of this chapter. The joint pmf of 
wd  and 
vd  after discretization can be derived from  ,wv w vf d d , i.e. the joint pdf of individual 
demand’s weight and volume before discretization. 
3.2.1 Phase I – Evolvement of Cumulative Weight and Volume  
Let  ; 0,1,...,nW W n N   be the process of cumulative weight with a state space 
 0,1,...,w wE c  and  ; 0,1,2,...,nV V n N   be the process of cumulative volume with 
a state space  0,1,...,v vE c . Recall that the probability of a booking request in one 
period is   and the probability of null event is 1  . A booking request has to satisfy bid 
price control criterion and capacity constraints before it can be accepted. These two 
criteria are represented by inequality equation (3.2) and (3.3) respectively. There are 
three possible events in each period: 
1. a demand arrives and is accepted 
2. a demand arrives but is rejected because it violates any of the two criteria 
3. no demand arrives 
The three possible events and their effects on state transition are illustrated in the 
following graph. 
 




Figure 3.1 Three transitions in booking process 
 
The first event will increase the cumulative weight and volume and thus, it is called 
acceptance transition. The second and third event will not change the cumulative weight 
and volume and thus, it is called no-change transition.  
Note that we do not consider cancellations and no-shows in the current research. In the 
case of air cargo, to model cancellations and no-shows, one needs to keep track of not 
only the total accepted cargos but also each single order as the size and weight of each 
cancellation or no-show is tied to a particular booking and whether partial fulfillment is 
allowed. This will only dramatically complicate the model. A simple way around this is 
to adjust for the effect of cancellations and no-shows by an appropriate overbooking limit. 
This idea is proposed by Belobaba (1987) and has been used in practice for passenger 
revenue management. Since cancellations and no-shows are not considered in this 
research, nW  and nV  are non-decreasing over n. 
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Let   , , 0,...,n nS W V n N  , and           1 1, Prob , , | , ,ij n n n nQ k l W V k l W V i j    . 
We have the following. 
Lemma 1 The process S is a discrete-time Markov chain with state 
w vE E  and 
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1 if a demand arrives in period n






Without loss of generality, let the size of demand in period n equal to  ,w vd d , if 1nI  . 
          
          
          
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
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n n n n
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W V k l W V i j W V
W V k l I W V i j W V





   
   
 
        
        
1 1 1
1 1 1
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n n n n n
n n n n n
W V k l I W V i j
W V k l I W V i j
  
  
   
   
 
The process S possesses Markovian property. 
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Case 1: No-change transition 
The probability of no-change transition consists of two parts. One is that no demand 
arrives and the other is that a demand arrives but is rejected. Given that a demand arrives, 
the rejection decision is due to the fact that the cargo fails to meet the two criteria. Since 
the arrival rate   is independent of the sales profile, 
 
        1 1 1
,
1 Prob , , | 1, , ,
ij
n n n n n
Q i j
W V i j I W V i j           
 
  1 1 Prob , , max , /w w v v w w v v w v si d c j d c h d h d p d d               (3.13) 
Case 2: Acceptance transition 
In any period, the happening of all following three events will result in a system 
acceptance transition from  1 1,n nW i V j    to  ,n nW k V l  : 
(1) a demand with weight wd k i   and volume vd l j   arrives in period n; 
(2) there is enough capacity for the demand 
(3) the revenue of this demand is larger than the opportunity cost 
The second event will definitely happen since , and ,w vi k E j l E  . Therefore, the 
acceptance transition probability is 
 
     1 1
,
Prob 1, , , max , / | , ,
ij
n w v w w v v w v s n n
Q k l
I d k i d l j h d h d p d d W V i j          
 
 







h k i h l j
d k i d l j p
k i l j


   
       
   
 (3.14) 
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Therefore, S is a discrete-time Markov chain with transition probability given in equation 
(3.12). □ 
Let   , ; , , ,ij w vQ k l i k E j l E  Q  denote the transition matrix of S. Since we do not 
consider cancellations and no-shows, Q  is an upper-triangular matrix. 
Let     ( ) Prob , ,nkl n nP W V k l  , wk E , vl E , denote the probability that the state of 
process S is  ,k l  in period n. Therefore, the state transition of S can be described by the 
following recursive function:  
  ( ) ( 1)
,
,n nkl ij ij
i j
P P Q k l   (3.15) 
Denote vector  ( ) ( ); ,n nkl w vP k E l E  P . Then equation (3.15) can be expressed in a 
matrix form: 
 ( ) ( 1)n nP P Q  (3.16) 
It is obvious that the initial state of S  is    0 0, 0,0W V   i.e. 
(0)
00 1P   and 
(0) 0;klP   
, 0, , 0w vk E k l E l      . Therefore, we can predict the state of S in any period based 
on equation (3.16). 
To better illustrate the model, we provide a small numerical example as follows. 
Example:  
Suppose 5vc , 5wc . The arrival rate λ is estimated as λ = 0.01. Suppose there are two 
types of cargo, ordinary cargo and precious good. The spot rate for ordinary cargo is 1.1 
and the spot rate for precious good is 1.3. Assume  Prob 1.1 0.7p    and 
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 Prob 1.3 0.3p   . The weight and volume of each individual cargo follows a join 
discrete distribution.  Prob 1, 1 0.4w vd d    ,  Prob 2, 2 0.3w vd d    , 
 Prob 2, 3 0.2w vd d    and  Prob 3, 2 0.1w vd d    . Assume that the distributions 
are the same for the two types of cargo. Let 1s  . Also, suppose the bid prices are 
5.0wh  and 7.0vh . Then, the one-step transition probability can be calculated from 
equation (3.12). For example,  
   00
0.5 0.7
1,1 0.01 Prob 1, 1 Prob 0.0012
1
w vQ d d p
 
       
 
 
    00 0,0 0.99 0.01 1 Prob 0.5 0.7 max ,w v w vQ d d p d d        
If    , 1,1w vd d  ,     Prob 0.5 0.7 max , Prob 1.2 0.3w v w vd d p d d p     ; 
If    , 2,2w vd d  ,     Prob 0.5 0.7 max , Prob 1.2 0.3w v w vd d p d d p     ; 
If    , 2,3w vd d  ,     Prob 0.5 0.7 max , Prob 3 3.1 1w v w vd d p d d p     ; 
If    , 2,3w vd d  ,     Prob 0.5 0.7 max , Prob 3 2.9 1w v w vd d p d d p     . 
Therefore,  00 0,0 0.9949Q  . Also, we have  00 2,2 0.0009Q  ,  00 2,3 0.002Q  , 
 00 3,2 0.001Q  , and other transition probabilities with initial state (0, 0) equal to zero. 
Other probabilities in the transition matrix can be calculated likewise. Based on the one-
step transition matrix, which is a 25 25 matrix in our example, we can calculate the state 
of the process in any decision period. 
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3.2.2 Phase I – Evolvement of Expected Revenue 
The evolvement of cumulative weight and volume of accepted cargos during booking 
season can be monitored based on stochastic process S. To meet our objective of 
maximizing the expected revenue, a model for tracking the expected revenue is needed as 
the revenue from each booking request is a nonlinear function of wd  and vd . 
Let  ; 0,1,...,nR n N  denote the airline’s expected revenue until period n. It is obvious 
that 
0 0R  ; 
Let  , |ij mQ k l p  denotes the probability that S transits from state    1 1, ,n nW V i j    to 
state    , ,n nW V k l  given that cargo rate is mp ;  
Let     , , , | max , /m m sr i j k l p p k i l j     denotes the incremental revenue received 
by the airline if S transits from state    1 1, ,n nW V i j    to state    , ,n nW V k l  given 
that cargo rate is mp .  
Then we have, for  1,2,...,n N , 
Lemma 2 Airline’s expected revenue until period n can be expressed as follows 
    ( 1) ( 2) (0)
, ,
... , , ,n nn ij ij ij
k l i j
R P P P i j k l       (3.17) 
where  
       
1
, , , , | , , , | Prob
a
ij m m m
m
i j k l Q k l p r i j k l p p p

                  (3.18) 
Proof: According to Lemma 1, 
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expected revenue until period 1 expected revenue accepted in period nR n n    
     ( 1)1
, , 1
, | , , , | Prob
a
n
n ij ij m m m
i j k l m
R P Q k l p r i j k l p p p

        
     ( 1)1
, , 1
, | , , , | Prob
a
n
n ij ij m m m
i j k l m
R P Q k l p r i j k l p p p

        
 ( 1)1
, ,
, , ,nn ij
k l i j
R P i j k l    
   ( 1) ( 2) (0)
, ,
... , , ,n nij ij ij
k l i j
P P P i j k l       □ 
Remark. From equation (3.18),  
 
     
    
1
, , ,
Prob , Prob max , /
max , / Prob for , , and , ,
0 otherwise
a
w v m s w w v v
m
m s m w v
i j k l
d k i d l j p k i l j h d h d






        








Let matrix   , , , ; , and ,w vi j k l i k E j l E   Π . The sum operator 
,i j
 in equation 
(3.17) can be recognized as a matrix multiplication operation, and thus,  
   ( 1) ( 2) (0)
,
... , , ,n nij ij ij
i j
P P P i j k l      
   ( 1) ( 2) (0) (0) 1 (0) 2 (0)... ...n n n n          P P P Π P Q P Q P I Π  (3.20) 
where I  is an identity matrix with corresponding dimension. 
The sum operator 
,k l
 in equation (3.17) can be recognized as a matrix multiplication 
operation as well and thus, equation (3.17) becomes 
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 (0) 1 (0) 2 (0)...n nnR      P Q P Q P I Π u                          (3.21) 
where u is a column vector with corresponding dimension and all its elements are equal 
to one, i.e.  
T
1,1,...,1u . 
Since    1 2 ...n n n       Q Q I I Q I Q , the right-hand side of equation (3.21) can be 
further simplified as    1(0) n   P I Q I Q Π u , if I Q  is a nonsingular matrix. 
Unfortunately, states    , ; orw vW V W c V c    of Markov chain S are absorbing 
states, and thus, I Q  is a singular matrix. Therefore, we have to partition the matrices in 
order to calculate nR .  
Let  0,1,..., 1w wE c   and  0,1,..., 1v vE c   denote two sets. The states of S can be 
classified into two categories. States   , ; ,w vW V W E V E   are transient states, 
denoted as  , and other states are absorbing states, denoted as c . Partition the 









where       , ; , T, , TijQ k l i j k l  Q ;       ˆ , ; , , , cijQ k l i j k l  Q ; and 
      , ; , , ,c cijQ k l i j k l  Q .  
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where     , , , ; ,i j k l i j  Π ; and     , , , 0; , ci j k l i j   Π . 
Let matrix   ( ) ( ); ,n nijP i j P . We then have, 
Theorem: Airline’s expected revenue until period n can be expressed as follows 





    P I Q I Q Π u     (3.24) 
Proof: Since  , , , 0i j k l   for any wi E  or vj E , according to Lemma 2,  
   
, ,
( 1) ( 2) (0)
, ,
... , , ,
w v w vk E l E i E j E
n n
n ij ij ij
k l i j
R P P P i j k l
   
                       (3.25) 
Again, the sum operator 
,
,






w vk E l E
k l
 
 in equation (3.25) can be recognized as 
matrix multiplication operations. Therefore, 
 ( 1) ( 2) (0)...n nnR      P P P Π u  (0) 1 (0) 2 (0)...n n      P Q P Q P Π u  (3.26) 
The matrix  
1
I Q  arises frequently in absorption calculations and is known as the 
fundamental matrix (Resnick, 1992). Since the state space is finite, I Q  is a nonsingular 






    P I Q I Q Π u             □ 
Recursive function (3.21), which tracks the evolvement of expected revenue over time, is 
a reward function built on discrete-time Markov chain S. S describes how the capacity of 
aircraft is consumed over time and R represents the reward that airline receives from the 
consumption of capacity. Because of this modeling technique, the use of high dimension 
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Markov chain is avoided and thus, the problem is more tractable. The transition can be 
shown in the following chart.  
 
Figure 3.2 Transition diagram of capacity and expected revenue 
 
3.2.3 Phase II – Optimizing control parameters: 
According to the theorem, we can develop the final expected revenue of system: 





    P I Q I Q Π u  (3.27) 
The final expected revenue of the system NR  is a function of bid prices andw vh h . Once 
andw vh h  are determined, the final expected revenue of the system can be obtained.  
So far, we have successfully solved phase I problem. In phase II problem, the optimal bid 
prices *wh  and 
*
vh  is to be determined so that the expected revenue is maximized. 
However, it is very difficult to develop close form solutions to *wh  and 
*
vh  since the 
structure of problem is very complex. Fortunately, Figure 3.3 shows that the surface of 
 ,N w vR h h  is unimodal and thus the optimal bid prices can be easily found by some 





Π(i, j, k, l) 
… RN 
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revenue is a discrete function of andw vh h , but the discrete function can be “smoothed” 
by precise discretization so that the numerical unconstrained optimization methods can 
provide satisfactory results. The direct searching algorithm instead of gradient based 
searching algorithm is chosen so that the “spiky” surface will render less negative effects 
on our searching. In the numerical analysis, simplex searching method (Murray (1972) 
p24-28) with nonnegative restriction is applied to find the optimal bid prices. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Surfaces of expected revenue with respect to bid prices 
 
3.3 Numerical Analysis 
As mentioned in the literature review, Pak and Dekker (2004) provided an algorithm for a 
single-leg short-term air cargo booking control problem with two-dimensional capacity 
constraints. First-Come-First-Booked (FCFB) can be viewed as another policy for air 
cargo booking control problem. In this section, simulation runs are conducted in order to 
compare the performance of the algorithm proposed in this thesis (named algorithm A in 
the remainder of this chapter) with the performance of the algorithm in Pak and Dekker 
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(2004) (named algorithm B) and the FCFB policy. These three policies are all static bid 
price control policies since the FCFB policy can be viewed as a bid-price control policy 
with two zero bid prices.  
The simulation procedures are as follows: 
Step 1. Set the capacities of the aircraft, demand distributions and the length of booking 
period. Solve the corresponding booking control problem using algorithm A and B and 
record the resulting control parameters respectively. The flow chart of step 1 is shown in 
Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4 Flow chart for step 1 of simulation  
Step 2. Generate a demand scenario based on the demand distribution and the length of 
booking period as assumed in step 1. Accept demands in this demand scenario under 
different bid prices of different policies and record the corresponding revenue 
respectively. The flow chart of step 2 is shown in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5 Flow chart for step 2 of simulation 
bid prices of 
algorithm A 














Algorithm A Capacities 
Demand Distribution 
Booking period 
bid prices of 
algorithm A 
Algorithm B 
bid prices of 
algorithm B 
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Step 3. Find the difference between the revenue of algorithm A and algorithm B, and also 
the difference between the revenue of algorithm A and the FCFB policy.  
Step 4. Repeat step 2 and step 3. Record the results and plot histograms.  
Step 5. Repeat step 1 ~ step 4 under different capacities, demand distribution and length 
of booking period. Compare the performance of the three policies under different 
situations. 
Boeing 747, which is commonly used combi-aircraft, is chosen as the aircraft in the 
simulation. The technical data of Boeing 747 is shown in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 Technical data of Boeing 747 
Type Boeing 747 
Max. Payload (kg) 63,917 
Seat Num. 400 
passenger weight (include luggage) (kg) 40,000 
cargo weight (kg) 23,917 






Short-term booking percentage 50% 
cargo weight for short-term booking (kg) 11,958.5 
cargo volume for short-term booking (m
3
) 54.5 
We assume that each passenger (including luggage) weights 100 kg, and the volume for 
the luggage of each passenger is 0.12 m
3. Therefore, under full customers’ loading, the 
weight available for cargo transportation is Max. payload 100 seat number 23,917 kg   , 
and the available volume for cargo transportation is total volume capacity – 0.12 × seat 
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number = 109 m
3
. We further assume that 50% of the capacity for cargo transportation is 
reserved for long-term contracts. Therefore, the available capacities for ad-hoc sales are 
11958.50 kg and 54.50 m
3
.  
The free-sale demand distribution is shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Parameters of demand distribution 
Demand Distribution Parameters Mean Standard deviation 
Weight Lognormal μ=6.2365,    σ=0.9380 793.474 (kg) 942.370 (kg) 





Volume Lognormal μ=0.9426,    σ=1.0823 4.61   (m
3
) 6.8791   (m
3
) 
The weight of each cargo follows a lognormal distribution with μ=6.2365 and σ=0.9380. 
The inverse density of each cargo follows a lognormal distribution with μ=-5.2939 and 
σ=0.5399. It is assumed that the cargo weight is independent of cargo density. Therefore, 
the volume of each cargo also follows a lognormal distribution with parameters μ=0.9426, 
σ=1.0823. These assumptions are adopted from Pak and Dekker (2004), in which it is 
claimed that these assumptions were derived from real data. Denote the joint pdf of the 
weight and volume of each cargo as  vwwv DDf , , where wD  and vD  are the weight and 
volume of cargo before discretization. The joint probability mass (pmf) function 
 vw dd ,Prob  needs to be derived from  vwwv DDf , , where wd  and vd  are the weight and 
volume of cargo after discretization. Suppose the discretization method described in 
equation (3.11) is used. Then, the joint pmf can be calculated by a numerical integration. 
For example, given that a demand arrives, the probability of  ydxd vw  , is 
























,,Prob , where wHx   and vHy  .  
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As mentioned in section 2.1, different types of cargos may have different profit rates p. In 
our numerical experiments, we assume that there are ten types of cargos. The profit rates 
and the corresponding probabilities that a cargo belongs to a certain type are listed in 
Table 3.3.  
Table 3.3 Profit rates and corresponding probabilities of cargos 
Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
profit rates 1.1 1.02 0.9 0.8 0.78 0.85 0.97 0.7 0.68 0.53 
probabilities 0.0835 0.0307 0.1241 0.0993 0.0699 0.0767 0.1399 0.1931 0.1151 0.0677 
Based on the initial condition introduced above, the performances of the three policies are 
simulated under different demand rates, which are shown in Table 3.4.  
Table 3.4 Demand rates of different simulation runs 
Parameters simulation 1 simulation 2 simulation 3 simulation 4 
decision period T (10 days) 1000 1500 2000 4000 
demand rate 0.0151 0.0201 0.02262 0.01885 
demand/capacity ratio (weight) 1 2 3 5 
sample size 20000 20000 20000  20000 
In simulation 1, the booking period is divided into 1000 decision periods. The demand 
follows a homogeneous Poisson process with demand arrival rate 0.0151   and thus, 
the expected total weight of demands is approximately equal to the capacity of aircraft. 
The sample size for each simulation run is 20000 so that histograms are stable. We 
change demand rates of the other 3 simulation runs so that the expected demand/capacity 
ratios are 2, 3 and 5 in terms of weight respectively. In doing so, the performances of the 
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three policies under peak demand period or non-peak demand period can be examined. 
The results of the four simulation runs are shown in the following Table and graphs. 
Table 3.5 Simulation results under different demand/capacity ratio 
  simulation 1 simulation 2 simulation 3 simulation 4 
A – B > 0 9290 (46.45%) 9516 (47.58%) 11450 (57.25%) 13264 (66.32%) 
A – B = 0 









A – FCFB > 0 0 15592 (77.96%) 18188 (90.94%) 19172 (95.86%) 
A – FCFB = 0 









Std of A 1666 1243.4 1163.8 1125.4 
Std of B 1900.4 1492.2 1866.6 2228.1 
Std of FCFB 1666 1030.9 1032 1035 
 
 
                         (a) simulation 1                                              (b) simulation 2 




                         (c) simulation 3                                            (d) simulation 4 
Figure 3.6 Histogram of the difference between the revenue of A and B 
 
 
                         (a) simulation 1                                              (b) simulation 2 
 
                         (c) simulation 3                                            (d) simulation 4 
Figure 3.7 Histogram of the difference between the revenue of A and FCFB 
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The second row in Table 3.5 records the number of samples (and the percentage of 
samples) for which algorithm A generates a higher revenue than algorithm B. The third 
row in Table 3.5 records the number of samples (and the percentage of samples) for 
which algorithm A generates the same revenue as algorithm B. The fourth row in Table 
3.5 records the number of samples (and the percentage of samples) for which algorithm B 
generates a higher revenue than algorithm A. In simulation 1, A outperforms B in 46.45% 
of all scenarios, whereas B outperforms A in 25.78% of all scenarios. As a result, A 
outperforms B in simulation 1. In simulation 2, A outperforms B in 47.58% of all 
scenarios, whereas B outperforms A in 47.78% of all scenarios. As a result, algorithm A 
is as good as algorithm B in simulation 2. Following the same way of comparison, we can 
see from Table 3.5 that algorithm A outperforms algorithm B in simulation 3 and 4. The 
following three rows in Table 3.5 are the comparisons between algorithm A and FCFB 
policy. It is clear that A significantly outperforms FCFB policy in simulation 2 ~ 4. The 
last three rows of Table 3.5 record the standard deviations of revenue under different 
policies respectively. From the results, we can see that the standard deviation of revenue 
obtained by algorithm A is smaller than that of algorithm B, though slightly higher than 
that of FCFB policy.  
Histograms in Figure 3.6 and 3.7 also show that A outperforms B and FCFB policy. The 
horizontal axis of Figure 3.6 is the difference between the revenue from A and B, and the 
vertical axis of Figure 3.6 is the number of replications/scenarios. The horizontal axis of 
Figure 3.7 is the difference between the revenue from A and FCFB, and the vertical axis 
of Figure 3.7 is the number of replications/scenarios. From these two figures, we can see 
that the scenarios located to the right of zero point are more than those to the left of zero 
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point in most cases. Therefore, it is clear that the algorithm proposed in this thesis 
outperforms Pak and Dekker’s algorithm and FCFB policy in most cases in terms of 
expected revenue.  
Table 3.5 and Figure 3.6 and 3.7 also show that the improvement from algorithm A 
becomes more significant as the demand/capacity ratio increases. The reason can be 
illustrated in Figure 3.8 and 3.9.  
 
Fig. 3.8 (a) surface of expected revenue          Fig. 3.8 (b) surface of standard deviation 
Figure 3.8 Surfaces with demand/capacity ratio equal to 1 
 
 
Fig. 3.9 (a) surface of expected revenue         Fig. 3.9 (b) surface of standard deviation 
Figure 3.9 Surfaces with demand/capacity ratio equal to 5 
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The demand/capacity ratio of Figure 3.8 is approximately equal to 1. In this case, most 
booking requests will be accepted due to the low demand. The results of different control 
policies are about the same. From Figure 3.8, one can see that the response surface 
around the peak is very flat. The difference between the expected revenue of peak point 
and the expected revenue of a point around the peak is very small compared to the 
standard deviation. As a result, the signal (difference between algorithm A and algorithm 
B) is overwhelmed by noise (variance of revenue). In contrast, the airline has much more 
flexibility to choose more “profitable” booking requests during the peak period of 
demand. Whether the optimal bid prices are chosen can greatly affect the expected 
revenue. From Figure 3.9, one can see that the response surface around the peak is much 
steeper when demand/capacity ratio is about 5. The difference between the expected 
revenue of peak point and the expected revenue of a point around the peak is around 2000, 
which is larger than the standard deviation. Therefore, the improvement from algorithm 
A is more significant during the peak period of demand.  
In conclusion, the algorithm proposed in this thesis can generate higher revenue than both 
Pak and Dekker’s algorithm and FCFB policy while providing consistent results.  
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Chapter 4 Long-Term Capacity Control in Contract Market 
In this chapter, we focus on the capacity allocation in the contract market. In section 4.1, 
a detailed description of the problem is given and a capacity bundling policy (CBP) is 
proposed to solve the problem. In section 4.2, some preliminaries and a business model 
will be introduced. Also, the mathematical model for airline’s problem and forwarder’s 
problem will be proposed and solved respectively. In section 4.3, it is assumed that the 
CBP takes a linear form. With this assumption, the forwarder’s problem and the airline’s 
problem are re-solved and some properties are explained. In section 4.4, some numerical 
experiments are conducted to further investigate the effects of this business model under 
various conditions.  
4.1 Introduction and problem description 
Here we focus on managing capacity allocation in contract market. In long-term contract 
market, it is a standard industry practice that air carriers and forwarders close long-term 
capacity agreements. In particular, forwarders order certain capacity between a certain 
origin-destination (O-D) pair in a certain time period, and resell the capacity to shippers. 
The demand in air cargo industry has strong seasonality. Usually, there will be a peak 
period from the beginning of November till the end of December. During this period, the 
total demand from shippers is significantly higher than the demand in other periods. The 
forwarders often face difficulties to lock in enough capacity in the peak season. In low 
season, however, the total demand from shippers is often less than airlines’ capacity and 
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airlines often face difficulties to sell out all capacity. The strong seasonality in demand 
and the relatively fixed supply create a mismatch between the supply (airline) and the 
demand (forwarder).  
Airlines also face a similar problem in passenger service sector, and a common way to 
solve this problem in RM is to charge a high price during the peak season while giving 
discount during the low season. However, this method may not be appropriate in air 
cargo industry, because the concerns in managing the guaranteed capacity contract are 
different from the concerns in passenger RM. In the sale of airline seats, each passenger 
booking only contributes a tiny part of the total revenue of the airline. Unlike passenger 
sales, which are anonymous and numerous, air cargo carriers work closely with a few 
important customers who ship large volumes. Long-term customer relations take priority. 
Therefore, most airlines do not charge a very high rate for the capacity in peak season to 
keep good relationships with forwarders.  
Besides the relationship considerations, the airline may also face the pressure from 
regulators. This can happen because the regulators are afraid that the high rate in the peak 
season will harm the business of large manufacturers and create negative effect on the 
country’s economic development. To attract the high-value manufacturers, the regulators 
may impose “invisible” restrictions on the rate of air cargo transportation. As a result, 
though the rate during the peak season is expected to be higher than the rate during low 
season, there will be an implicit upper bound for the rate in peak season.  
To make things more complicated, the long-term capacity agreements are signed several 
months in advance. As a result, the forecasting of the future demand can be very 
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inaccurate. Because of the uncertainty in the forecasting, forwarders are not willing to 
make any fixed commitment in low seasons, if there are no substantial benefits from the 
commitment. In turn, forwarders’ unwillingness to make fixed commitment creates a lot 
of uncertainty in the airline’s revenue during low seasons, and thus, the airline relies 
more on the revenue from peak season. As a result, it is more difficult for forwarders to 
get enough capacity at a reasonable rate during the peak season.  
To deal with the seasonality, many airlines in air cargo industry adopt a capacity 
bundling policy (CBP). In particular, the capacity during the peak season that each 
forwarder can lock in depends on its order quantity during the low season. The more 
capacity the forwarder orders during the low season, the more guaranteed capacity it can 
get during the peak season. As a result, the forwarder has incentive to book more capacity 
during the low season as a support to the airline, and expect for the reciprocation from the 
airline during the peak season.  
The CBP has several benefits. First, this policy can motivate forwarders to market more 
aggressively during the low season and save them the efforts to secure capacity during 
the peak season. Second, this policy may increase the airline’s load factor during the low 
season and smooth the revenue over a year. Last but not the least, the airline adopting the 
CBP can have an advantage over those airlines who do not adopt the policy. After years 
operations, airlines and forwarders can form strong strategic alliance, and thus, can 
achieve better risk sharing. Because of these advantages, many airlines adopt such a 
policy nowadays.  
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Although the CBP is widely adopted by airlines, there is a lack of quantitative analysis of 
its effect on the expected profit and risk of the airline. Here, risk is defined as the 
probability that the airline’s profit over a year is less than a certain sales target. Also, 
whether the policy is not as effective as expected under some conditions is still an open 
question. Therefore, we would like to study these questions in this research. 
As explained in chapter 2, Hellermann (2006) is the only literature that addressed the 
long-term capacity allocation problem in air cargo industry. However, Hellermann (2006) 
focused on the design of options contract in order to mitigate the effect of forwarders’ 
defaulting on penalties for unused capacity. The mismatch between supply and demand 
in air cargo industry was not addressed and the correlation between different seasons was 
not considered. 
It seems that the long-term capacity control problem is similar to the problem considered 
in supply chain management (SCM). The problem considered in this thesis is a two-
echelon, multi-period, static pricing SCM problem with perishable product and no 
backlog of demand. Since no demand and capacity can be backlogged into the next 
period, it seems that the multi-period problem can be decomposed into several 
independent single-period SCM problems. However, to mitigate the mismatch between 
demand and supply in different periods, the CBP is adopted and it links the revenue in 
peak seasons with the decisions in the low seasons. Thus, the long-term capacity control 
problem is different from the commonly considered SCM problems. 
 
 
Chapter 4 Long-Term Capacity Control in Contract Market 
58 
 
4.2 Long-term capacity allocation problem 
4.2.1 Preliminaries and the business model 
Notations: 
itQ  – forwarder i’s order quantity in period t; 
tw  – contract rate in period t; 
tx   
– penalty rate for the unused capacity in period t;
 
tC  – airline’s capacity in period t; 
itp  – forwarder i’s resale rate in period t; 
itD  – stochastic demand faced by forwarder i in period t; 
itd  – deterministic part of the demand faced by forwarder i in period t; 
it  – stochastic noise of the demand faced by forwarder i in period t; 
 it itf   and  it itF   – pdf and cdf of stochastic noise respectively.  
We consider an air cargo industry, which includes one major airline serving n forwarders. 
The planning horizon is one year. We assume that the planning horizon can be divided 
into m periods. The capacity that the airline will provide in period t is denoted as tC . It is 
assumed that this capacity is given. At the beginning of the year, the airline announces 
the contract rates tw  in each period. Then, each forwarder closes long-term contracts with 
the airline to reserve certain capacity between an O-D pair in each period. The order 
quantity from forwarder i in period t is denoted as itQ . The forwarder decides the order 
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quantity according to the contract rate 
tw  and its forecasting of the future demand in the 
period. Forwarder i’s estimation of future demand from shippers in period t is denoted as  
it it it it it it itD d a b p      , 1,2,...,t m , 
where ita  and itb  are parameters of the linear demand function, 0ita   and 0itb  ;  
itp  is forwarder i’s resale rate in period t;  
 ,it it it    is the noise of demand, which follows a cdf  it itF  .  
This linear additive demand function is widely used in newsboy problems and is studied 
by both Lau and Lau (1988) and Polatoglu (1991). Here, it is assumed that the resale rate 
itp  is not a decision variable of forwarder i. According to Hellermann (2006), forwarders 
usually do not decide the resale rate analytically. Typically, they will add a markup to the 
contract rate to cover their cost and profit. As a result, we assume that  1it t itp w    , 
where it  denotes the markup of forwarder i in period t and it is known by the airline. If 
the actual demand from its customers is less than its ordered capacity, the forwarder has 
to pay penalty t t tx w  to the airline for each unit of unused capacity, where t  is the 
penalty ratio in period t.  
For the ease of presentation, we assume that periods 1 to k are low seasons, while periods 
1k   to m are peak seasons. Any change in the sequence of the low/peak seasons will not 
affect the mathematical formulation and the results. During low seasons, the total demand 
from shippers is generally less than the capacity of the airline. Although the demand from 
shippers can be close to the airline’s capacity in some periods during low seasons, the 
airline has no incentive to encourage the forwarders to book more capacity in these 
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periods by sacrificing some profit in peak season. In such a case, the airline’s problem 
and the forwarders problem are not related to the problems in other periods and they can 







  and the airline 
will accept all orders in the low seasons. Also, it is assumed that the unsold capacity of 
the airline in the low season has no salvage value. In contrast, the demand from 
forwarders will always exceed the airline’s capacity during the peak period. It results 
from both seasonality and the restriction on airline’s pricing.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the airline adopts a CBP that the guaranteed 
capacity that each forwarder can get during the peak season depends on its order 
quantities during the low season. Let itc  denote forwarder i’s guaranteed capacity during 
the peak season.  
 1 2, ,...,it t i i ikc Q Q Q ,  1,...,t k m   
where  t  is a given function and it is known by both the airline and forwarders. 
The airline’s problem is to decide the contract rate tw  in each period so that the expected 
profit over a year is maximized. The forwarder’s problem is to decide the order quantity 
itQ  in each period so that the expected profit over a year is maximized. 
4.2.2 Forwarder’s problem 
Let  it itQ  denote forwarder i’s expected profit in period t in low season, given its order 
quantity itQ . Then,  it itQ  can be expressed as follows. 
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   1,2,...,t k   (4.1) 
During the peak season, the total demand from the shippers is considerably higher than 
the capacity of the airline, and thus, we assume that forwarders can always sell out all the 
guaranteed capacity. Therefore, the expected profit of forwarder i over period t in peak 
season can be expressed as  
   , 1,...,it it t itp w c t k m       (4.2) 
where  1 2, ,...,it t i i ikc Q Q Q , 1,...,t k m  . 
The objective of the forwarder is to find the optimal order quantity in each period so that 
the expected profit over a year is maximized. This can be modeled as follows. 
  









   (4.3) 
Let  1t itU Q  denotes the forwarder i’s maximal expected profit over periods t, t+1, …, 
m, given that the forwarder’s order quantity over period 1, 2, …, 1t   is 
 1 1 1,...,it i itQ Q Q . Then  1t itU Q  can be expressed as the following recursive 
function. 
       1 1 1max , , 1,...,
it
t it t it it it it
Q
U U Q Q t k    Q Q  (4.4) 
      1
1 1
m m
k ik it it t t ik
t k t k
U p w 
   
    Q Q  (4.5) 
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The forwarder’s problem can be solved via dynamic programming, and the optimal order 
quantity *
itQ  can be obtained. 
4.2.3 Airline’s problem 
Once we understand how the forwarders will response to the airline’s pricing, we can 
start to analyze the airline’s problem. The airline has a crude estimate of the demand AitD  
that the forwarder i will face in period t, which is denoted as  
 , 1,2,...,A A A Ait it it it itD a b p t m     (4.6) 
where Aita  and 
A
itb  are airline’s estimate of the parameters in the demand function, 0
A
ita   
and 0Aitb  ;  
itp  is forwarder i’s resale rate in period t;  
A
it  is the airline’s estimate of the noise of demand, which follows a cdf  A Ait itF  .  
The airline’s estimate cannot be as accurate as forwarder’s forecasting, and thus, the 
parameters in equation (4.6) can be different from the parameters forecasted by the 
forwarder. 
Based on its estimation of forwarders’ future demands, the airline can predict forwarders’ 
responses to the contract rates in each period. Let  * * *1 2, ,...,A A Ai i ikQ Q Q  denote forwarder i’s 
optimal order quantities, and let At denote the expected profit of the airline in period t. 
Then, in low seasons, 
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In peak season, 
itc  becomes the actual used capacity, since all forwarders will use up the 







 , the airline has to purchase additional capacity from 
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where ts  is the expected spot rate in period t in peak season. 
The airline’s objective is to find the optimal contract rate in each period so that the 












                                      s.t.              t tw ub , 1,...,t m  
where tub  is the upper bound on airline’s contract rate in period t. 
Due to the complexity of *AitQ , it is very difficult to derive the close form solution to the 
airline’s problem. Some numerical searching algorithm, such as genetic algorithm, can be 
applied to find the optimal pricing strategy of the airline. 
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4.3 Long-term capacity allotment under linear  t  
In the long-term contract market, the guaranteed capacity not only depends on the order 
quantities during the low seasons, but also depends on the bargain power of the forwarder 
and some other market conditions. The function that reflects the relationship between the 
guaranteed capacity and low seasons order quantities can take many different forms. 
Therefore, the guaranteed capacity in the peak season is calculated by a function  t  
without a specific expression in the previous section. This provides the most general 
model for the long-term capacity allocation. Because of the general function  t , 
however, we cannot do much analysis on the structure of the problem in the previous 
section.  







 , 0 1t  . In this section, we will analyze the structure of the long-term 
capacity allocation problem in details under a linear  t . To simplify the problem, we 
assume that period 1 ~ m − 1 are low seasons and the last period m is the peak season. 
Then, the forwarder’s problem and the airline’s problem will be resolved, and some 
properties will be explained. 
4.3.1 Forwarder’s problem 
The forwarder i’s objective function is  
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Proposition 1: The optimal order quantity of forwarder i in period t is 
 * 1 1,..., 1it t t im mit it it
it t t
p w p w
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Proof: The objective function can be reorganized in a way that the second ∑ in equation 
(4.9) is opened and the profit  im m t itp w Q  is associated with  it itQ  in the 
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After the reorganization,  it itQ  only depends on the order quantity in the current 
period t. Therefore, the forwarder’s problem can be separated as m – 1 independent 
optimization problems. The first derivatives of  it itQ  is  
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 (4.10) 





 , if it it itQ d   . Therefore, 
*
it it itQ d   . 
If  t im m tp w x   , the forwarder will book as much as possible during the low season 
to increase the profit during the peak season. However, this case will never happen. The 
Chapter 4 Long-Term Capacity Control in Contract Market 
66 
 
airline cannot have unlimited access to capacity in spot market during the peak season, 
and thus, the unlimited guaranteed capacity will result in great loss to the airline. The 
airline will avoid such loss by setting  t t im mx p w  . Thus, the optimal order quantity 
of forwarder i in period t is  
 * 1 1,..., 1it t t im mit it it
it t t
p w p w
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□ 
4.3.2 Airline’s problem 
The airline’s expected profit in period m is  



































*   (4.11) 
where 
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 is the airline’s prediction of the 
forwarder i’s optimal order quantity in period t. 
Using the same technique as in the above proof, we can reorganize the airline’s profit in 
each period so that the airline’s problem can be separated as m sub-problems. Here, the 
airline’s capacity during the peak season is denoted as C. 
Let 
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A
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   
s.t.     t tw ub , 1,...,t m  
In doing so, the At  only depends on the contract rate in the current period tw  and the 
contract rate at the peak season mw .  
Proposition 2: The airline’s profit over a year is monotonically increasing with mw . 
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Let it t it t t t it m t t t t im m t m it t t m t t m it t t m tx w x w w x w w w w w x s w s x                   . 
Then,      it t t t im m it t t t m t m t t im mw x w w x w s x p s              
            t t t m t m it t t t m t m t t m im t t im mw x w s w x w s w s p x p s                 
           1t t t m t m it t t t m t m t t t m imw x w s w x w s w s p                
Because of the CBP, forwarder i can get t  unit of capacity in the peak season for each 
unit of capacity ordered during period t in the low season. If 0t t m t mx w s    , 
forwarder i will order infinite capacity during the low season in order to exploit the profit 
in the spot market in the peak season. This is obviously not optimal for the airline. 
Therefore, 0t t m t mx w s    . Similarly, 0t t im mx w   . Therefore, 0it   for 
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. The airline’s 
profit over a year is monotonically increasing with mw . □ 
Therefore, the optimal contract rate in the peak season is equal to the upper bound of 
airline’s pricing. Once we obtained the *mw , we can solve for the optimal tw . The easiest 
way to do so is to exhaustively search all possible tw  in each period.  
Besides the contract rate and order quantity, the guaranteed ratio αt also plays an 
important role in the long-term contract. It represents the airline’s attitude towards the 
CBP. A high αt shows the airline has strong incentive to exchange the capacity during the 
peak season with the profit in low season t. In contrast, a guaranteed ratio αt = 0 shows 
that the airline has no incentive to adopt the CBP in period t. Therefore, the value of 
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guaranteed ratio shows whether the CBP is effective from a certain angle. A way to 
calculate the optimal guaranteed ratio in each period is needed. Given that one decision 
period in our model usually represents two months or a quarter in the real world, the 
number of guaranteed ratios is limited and thus, exhaustively searching for the optimal 
guaranteed ratios is acceptable. 
At the end of this section, we provide a flow chart to further illustrate the algorithm 
proposed in this thesis to solve the long-term capacity allocation model.  
 
Figure 4.1 Flow chart of the long-term capacity allocation model 
At the beginning, forwarder’s problem is decomposed into several sub-problems, and the 
sub-problem in each decision period is solved based on the forecasting of future demand, 
the penalty ratio and markup ratio to obtain the optimal order quantity. These order 
Forwarder i’s 
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Demand forecasting 1iD , 
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*
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search for *tw  
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quantities are functions of the airline’s contract rate in the current period 
tw  and the 
contract rate in the peak season 
mw . By feeding these order quantities into the airline’s 
sub-problem in each period, we can obtain the objective function At . Then, the optimal 
contract rate in each period in low season is obtained by maximizing At . According to 
proposition 2, *m mw ub . Next, all 
*
tw  will be obtained via exhaustive search.  
4.4 Numerical Experiments 
As explained in the beginning of this chapter, one reason for the airline’s adopting of the 
CBP is that the airline cannot charge a very high rate in the peak season. Intuitively, the 
airline has no incentive to adopt the CBP if the expected spot rate is very high during the 
peak season. Therefore, the performance of CBP depends on the upper bound of airline’s 
contract rate and the expected spot rate during the peak. Also, the CBP can encourage 
forwarders to market more aggressively in low seasons. However, if forwarders’ demand 
forecasting is perfectly accurate, they will only book capacity equal to the future demand. 
Therefore, it is expected that the performance of CBP also depends on the variation of the 
future demand. In this section, we are going to analyze the performance of the CBP under 
various market conditions. 
In this section, it is assumed that 1 airline serves 3 forwarders in the market and one fiscal 
year can be divided into 6 periods. The first 5 periods are low seasons and the last period 









  . With a single guaranteed ratio, we 
can clearly observe how the optimal ratio changes in different market conditions. The 
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capacity in each period is set to be 100. Some other parameters are chosen arbitrarily as 
follows. 
Table 4.1 The parameters used in the numerical experiments 
  Period 1  Period 2  Period 3  Period 4  Period 5  Period 6  
a1  38 30 37 41 38 78 
a2  40 32 41 45 38 84 
a3  35 29 36 42 37 74 
b1  6 6.2 6.1 6.4 5.5 5 
b2  6 6 6.1 6.3 5.7 5 
b3  6 6.1 6.1 6.5 5.5 5 
cv  0.25 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.3 0.15 
γ  20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
β  50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 70% 
 
In table 4.1, a1, a2, a3 and b1, b2, b3 are the parameters in the demand functions faced by 
forwarder 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The residue in the demand function for forwarder i 
follows a truncated normal distribution, i.e.  ~ 0,it itN   and 
 [max 0, 2 ,2 ]it it it itd    , where it it it itd a b p  ; it t itcv d   ; cvt is the coefficient of 
variation. In this section, it is assumed that the 3 forwarders have the same markup ratio γ, 
which is 20%. The penalty ratio β is set to be 50% in the low season and 70% in the peak 
season. The upper bound for the airline’s contract rate is set to 3.5. It is assumed that the 
spot rate during the peak season follows a truncated normal distribution, i.e. 
 ~ , sm m ms N s   and 2 , 2s sm m m m ms s s      , where ms  is the expected spot rate and is 
up to change in the following experiments; sm  is the standard deviation of the spot rate 
and is set to 0.7. Under the parameters listed in Table 1, the sum of the optimal order 
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quantities in a low season period is around 50, given that the airline does not adopt the 
CBP. Whereas, the sum of the demand faced by forwarders in the peak season is larger 
than 100, even if the airline charges the highest contract rate. Therefore, the market 
settings correspond to the assumptions in this thesis.  
When adopting the CBP, the airline has to sell part of the capacity to forwarders in the 
peak season under contract rate, which is much lower than the expected spot rate ms . The 
larger the difference between the contract rate and expected spot rate, the more the airline 
loses in the peak season. Intuitively, when the expected spot rate is too high, adopting the 
capacity bundling policy will reduce the airline’s expected profit. In the first numerical 
experiment, we would like to compare the expected profit of the airline when the CBP is 
used and when it is not used under different ms . The procedures for the experiment are 
explained as follows.  
Step 1. Set parameters as explained above and choose an initial expected spot rate sm. 
Then, solve the optimal guaranteed ratio α*, airline’s contract rate in each period, and 
order quantity from each forwarder in each period. 
Step 2. Generate demand for each forwarder in each period according to the demand 
distribution. Calculate the profit of the airline under the demand series when CBP is 
adopted and when it is not, i.e. α = 0.  
Step 3. Simulate step 2 repeatedly and record the results. Then, calculate 















, where PI is the percentage improvement on 
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airline’s expected profit;   *AE    is the airline’s expected profit under CBP; 
  0AE     is the airline’s expected profit without CBP. 
Step 4. Change expected spot rate and redo the first 3 steps. 
The procedures for the experiment are further illustrated in the following chart. 
 
Figure 4.2 The flow chart of the procedures in experiment 1. 
 
The results of simulation 1 are shown in Figure 4.5. 
 
(a)                                                    (b) 
Figure 4.3 The optimal α and percentage improvement under different ms in experiment 1 





profit under α* 
Calculate airline’s 
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The horizontal axis in Figure 4.5 is the ratio of 
ms  to the upper bound of contract rate. 
The vertical axis in Figure 4.5(a) records the optimal guaranteed ratio under the market 
condition, and the vertical axis in Figure 4.5(b) records the corresponding percentage 
improvement. From Figure 4.5(a), we can observe that the α* decreases with 
ms . As α
* 
decreases, the influence of CBP decrease, and thus, the percentage improvement also 
decreases with sm. When  ms  is close to the forwarder’s resale rate, i.e. the horizontal axis 
equal to 1.2, α* is close to zero, and thus, the improvement that the bundling policy can 
provide is insignificant, which can be shown in Figure 4.5(b).  
Experiment 1 shows that the CBP can significantly increase the expected profit of the 
airline when ms  is less than the forwarder’s resale rate. With CBP, the capacity in the 
peak period is sold under a higher rate, i.e. forwarder’s resale rate, rather than the spot 
rate. The increment in the profit is distributed between the airline and forwarders via the 
increased payment in low season. When ms  is slightly higher than the forwarder’s resale 
rate, CBP can still slightly increase the expected profit of the airline. This increase results 
from the effect that the CBP can stimulate the forwarder to book more capacity in the low 
season. When the demand is unexpectedly high in any period in low season, it is more 
likely that the forwarder can accommodate the demand. However, CBP cannot increase 
the expected profit when ms  is considerably higher than forwarder’s resale rate. 
During the peak season, the capacity is scarce and the forwarder may want to earn more 
profit from the guaranteed capacity. Thus, it is natural that a forwarder sets a higher 
markup ratio in the peak season than that in the low season. In the next two experiments, 
the markup ratio in the peak season is increased to 25% and 30%. Then, we solve for α* 
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and the corresponding percentage improvement on the expected profit of the airline, 
respectively. The simulation procedures are the same as in experiment 1. The results are 




 (a)                                          (b)                                          (c) 
Figure 4.4 The optimal α under different ms  in the three experiments 
 
(a)                                            (b)                                          (c) 
Figure 4.5 The percentage improvement under different ms  in the three experiments 
Figure 4.6 (a), (b) and (c) show the optimal α in experiment 1, 2 and 3, respectively. 
Figure 4.7 (a), (b) and (c) show the percentage improvement in experiment 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively. From Figure 4.6 and 4.7, we can see that the results in experiment 2 and 3 
are similar as the result in experiment 1. Again, α* and percentage improvement decrease 
with sm. When sm is close to forwarder’s resale rate, α
*
 is close to zero and CBP cannot 
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significantly increase the expected profit of the airline. The only difference is that the 
percentage improvement becomes more significant as the markup ratio increases. The 
increased markup ratio reflects the increased severity of the imbalance between supply 
and demand in the peak season. Adopting the CBP enables the airline to sell the capacity 
under a higher rate, and thus, achieve a more significant improvement in the expected 
profit.  
The CBP can increase the airline’s expected profit from two sources, increasing the 
selling rate in the peak season and encouraging forwarders to market more aggressively 
in the low season. The first source depends on sm and forwarder’s resale rate, and is 
analyzed in experiments 1, 2 and 3. The latter source depends on the variation of the 
future demand. In the following two experiments, therefore, we increase the coefficient 
of variation of the residue for each forwarder, and analyze its effect on the performance 
of the CBP. The coefficients of variation used in experiment 4 and 5 are shown in the 
following table. 
Table 4.2 The coefficient of variation used in experiment 4 and 5 
  Period 1  Period 2  Period 3  Period 4  Period 5  Period 6  
Experiment 4 0.22 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.27 0.15 
Experiment 5 0.3 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.35 0.15 
 
Compared to the parameters used in experiment 1, each cv in the low season is decreased 
by 0.03 in experiment 4 and increased by 0.05 in experiment 5. The procedures for the 
two experiments are the same as in experiment 1. The results are shown as follows. 
Again, the result in experiment 1 is included for the ease of comparison. 




(a)                                            (b)                                          (c) 
Figure 4.6 The optimal α under different cv in the three experiments 
 
(a)                                           (b)                                          (c) 
Figure 4.7 The percentage improvement under different cv in the three experiments 
 
Figure 4.8 (a), (b) and (c) show the optimal α in experiment 1, 4 and 5, respectively. 
Figure 4.9 (a), (b) and (c) show the percentage improvement in experiment 1, 4 and 5, 
respectively. It is observed that the percentage improvement in experiment 4 is the least 
significant whereas the percentage improvement in experiment 5 is the most significant. 
The reason for these results is explained as follows. With large variation of demand, 
aggressive marketing in low seasons can enable the forwarder to benefit from unexpected 
high demand, while the lost from unexpected low demand is partially compensated by the 
gains from the peak season. Therefore, the improvement from forwarder’s aggressive 
marketing in the low season decrease/increase as the variation of demand 
decrease/increase. As an extreme case, the benefit from aggressive marketing will 
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diminish when forwarder’s forecasting of future demand is perfectly accurate. In air 
cargo industry, forwarder will forecast the future demand several months in advance. The 
forecasting can be very inaccurate. With a positive relationship between the effect of 
CBP and variation of demand, we believe that it will provide significant improvement on 
the expected profit of the airline. 
In the next experiment, the effect of CBP on the risk of the airline’s profit is analyzed. 
Generally, the risk of profit in air cargo industry is defined as the probability that the 
profit falls below a certain sales target. Here, the expected profit of the airline without 
CBP is chosen as a sales target, and thus, the risk of airline’s profit is defined as 
     *risk P 0E      . The procedures of experiment are generally the same as 
in experiment 1. However, we do not calculate the percentage improvement here. After 
  0E     is obtained based on the simulation results, the  *   in each simulation 
scenario is compared with   0E    , and the number of cases in which  *   is less 
than   0E     is recorded. Then, the ratio of this number to the total simulation run 
will be the risk of airline’s profit. The result is shown in Figure 4.10. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 The effect of capacity bundling policy on risk 
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Figure 4.10 shows that the CBP can reduce the risk of the airline, when 
ms  is less than 
the forwarder’s resale price. The effect can be very significant, when 
ms  is considerably 
lower than the forwarder’s resale price. The reduction of risk results from two main 
reasons. First, CBP can improve the airline’s expected profit, when ms  is less than the 
forwarder’s resale price. As a result, the chance that  *   is less than   0E     is 
reduced. Second, the capacity bundling policy can reduce the standard deviation of the 
profit of the airline, which is shown in Figure 4.11. 
 
 
  (a)                                                   (b) 
Figure 4.9 The effect of CBP on standard deviation of profit 
 
In Figure 4.11(b), the dash line represents the standard deviation of airline’s profit with 
CBP, whereas the solid line represents the standard deviation of airline’s profit without 
CBP. It is clear that CBP can reduce the standard deviation. When sm is lower than 
forwarder’s resale rate, the guaranteed ratio α* is relatively large, and the reduction on 
standard deviation is more obvious. As sm increases, α
*
 approaches zero and the standard 
deviation converges to the standard deviation without CBP. Under CBP, airline will sell 
the guaranteed capacity to forwarder under contract rate in the peak season. The 
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difference between the expected spot rate and contract rate is considered as the 
opportunity cost of the guaranteed capacity, and this opportunity cost is compensated 
through the higher profit in low seasons. This is equivalent to selling the capacity in peak 
season in advance under a more certain rate. Therefore, the volatility in the spot rate is 
avoided and the standard deviation of airline’s profit is reduced. Since CBP can increase 
the expected profit and reduce the standard deviation, it is natural that CBP can reduce 
the airline’s risk in profit, when sm is lower than forwarder’s resale rate. 
In summary, the CBP can increase the airline’s expected profit when the expected spot 
rate is close to or lower than forwarder’s resale rate during the peak season. As the 
expected spot rate decreases, the improvement on the expected profit becomes more 
significant. However, the CBP cannot significantly increase the expected profit, when 
expected spot rate is higher than the forwarder’s resale rate, because the airline loses 
more during the peak season than its gain during the low seasons. The policy’s influence 
on the expected profit becomes stronger as the variation of the demand increases. 
Therefore, when the forwarder’s future demand is highly unpredictable, the airline can 
benefit from CBP. Besides, the capacity bundling policy can reduce the risk of the 
airline’s profit, when expected spot rate is lower than forwarder’s resale rate. 
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Chapter 5 Integration of the Short-Term and Long-Term RM 
Models 
In chapter 3 and 4, we develop RM tools for the capacity control in spot market and 
contract market, respectively. As explained in the introduction chapter, the two markets 
are correlated. A RM system for air cargo capacity control should be able to integrate the 
models for contract market and spot market, and jointly allocate capacity to the two 
markets. In section 5.1, we will provide a conceptual framework of an air cargo capacity 
control system, which can achieve the reasonable allocation of capacity between the two 
markets. In section 5.2, we will discuss several issues in the capacity control system. 
Again, we consider a market with one major airline serving several forwarders.  
5.1 Integration of capacity control in spot market and contract market 
In chapter 3, we develop a Markovian model for capacity control on spot market. The 
function of the model can be illustrated in Figure 5.1 
 
Figure 5.1 Function of the Markovian model 
Markovian 
Model 
Forecasting of future 
demand on spot market 
Spot rates for different 
types of cargo 
Total capacity for 
spot market 
Expected revenue 
from spot market 
Opportunity cost of 
capacity 
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As shown in Figure 5.1, the inputs to the Markovian model include the forecasting of 
future demand on spot market, spot rates for different types of cargo, and the total 
capacity allocated to spot market. The last input depends on the order quantities in the 
long-term capacity agreements, and thus, depends on capacity control on the contract 
market. With all three inputs, the Markovian model can provide the expected profit from 
a specific flight in spot market. Let sjC  denote the capacity on flight j that is allocated to 
the spot market. Let  sjE R  denote the expected revenue from flight j in the spot market. 
Then, the opportunity cost of the capacity can be obtained as   /s s sj j joc E R C . This 
opportunity cost will be used later in this section. 
In chapter 4, we develop a capacity allocation model, which adopts the capacity bundling 
policy, for contract market. The function of the model is illustrated in the following graph. 
 
Figure 5.2 Function of the long-term capacity allocation model 
As shown in Figure 5.2, the inputs to the long-term capacity allocation model include the 
forecasting of each forwarder’s demand function, the expected spot rate in the peak 
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rate in the peak season is actually the opportunity cost of capacity in spot market during 
the peak season. As explained above, this opportunity cost can be derived from the 
Markovian model for short-term capacity allocation.  
From the above analysis, we can see that the output of long-term capacity allocation 
model is the input of short-term capacity allocation model and the output of the short-
term model is the input of long-term model. A way to integrate the two models and 
jointly solve the problem is to solve the two models iteratively, which is shown in the 
following chart. 
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Before we introduce how the integrated model works, we need to clarify some necessary 
inputs to the model. First, the airline has to forecast the aggregate demand in the spot 
market during the peak season. Here, the aggregate demand is used rather than the 
demand on each specific flight during the peak season. In the long-term capacity 
allocation, the airline often negotiates the contract rates and order quantities with 
forwarders 1 year or several months before the peak season. The forecasting of spot 
demand on each specific flight several months in advance can be very inaccurate. 
Without accurate input data, the result from the Markovian model is unreliable. Also, 
using aggregate demand and capacity in a long period, say one month, can bring in the 
risk pooling effect, and thus, the result from the Markovian model is more stable. If the 
demand and supply in each flight is used instead, we may get a spiky rate curve because 
of the congestion of demand on some specific flight. Second, the airline has to forecast 
the aggregate capacity available in the peak season. Here, the two-dimensional 
characteristic of capacity is not considered, since this opportunity cost will be fed into the 
long-term capacity allocation model, in which the two-dimensionality can be neglected 
without affecting the accuracy of the result. Third, the airline has to estimate the spot 
rates for different types of cargo during the peak season. Here, we assume that the spot 
rates during the peak season are exogenously determined. As explained in chapter 4, the 
airline has to consider the relationship with major forwarders and shippers, and may face 
price regulations. Therefore, the airline cannot charge a revenue-maximizing spot rate 
during the peak season. Also, forwarders can be active players in spot market and affect 
the spot rates. In such a case, the airline can combine the forecasting of demand and 
historical rates to estimate the spot rates in the peak season. 
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After clarifying the necessary inputs to the integrated model, we can analyze how it 
works now. To solve the Markovian model, the total capacity allocated to spot market in 
the peak season is needed. At the first iteration, the total capacity available in the peak 
season will be allocated to the spot market. This is the optimal allocation when CBP is 
not adopted, since the expected spot rate is much higher than the contract rate. With the 
aggregate demand, aggregate capacity in spot market, and the spot rates, we can solve the 
Markovian model to obtain the aggregate expected profit from the spot market in peak 
season. Let  sAE R  denote the aggregate expected profit and AC  denote the aggregate 
capacity during the peak season. The overall opportunity cost can be approximated as 
  /sA A AOC E R C .  
Then, AOC  can be fed into the long-term capacity allocation model to determine the 
contract rate and the corresponding order quantity in each period. Under CBP, the airline 
will sell the guaranteed capacity in peak season to forwarders under contract rate. 
Therefore, the capacity allocated to spot market during the peak season will be equal to 
the total capacity less the guaranteed capacity during peak season. The opportunity cost 
of capacity in peak season will be compensated by the increase in revenue during low 
seasons. Using updated capacity for spot market, the Markovian model will be solved 
again to obtain the adjusted AOC . Then, this AOC  will be fed into the long-term model to 
solve the updated capacity allocation again. These two models are solved iteratively and 
repeatedly until the solution becomes stable. The final solution will be the suggested 
long-term capacity allocation plan. Based on this plan, the short-term capacity allocation 
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can be derived by solving the Markovian model as the departure of a certain flight 
approaches. 
5.2 Several issues in the integrated model 
5.2.1 Contract rate 
The long-term capacity allocation model is a macro level decision model. The contract 
rates and order quantities obtained from the model cannot be the exact terms in the 
guaranteed capacity agreements, because of the following three reasons: 
1. The airline’s forecasting can be different from forwarder’s forecasting. The contract 
rates derived from the model are based on the airline’s forecasting, and thus, may be 
very different from forwarders’ expectations. 
2. The contract rate is based on the aggregate demand and supply in the decision period 
and it is assumed to be homogenous for the entire decision period. However, the real 
contract rate in the decision period varies depending on the day of the week, the 
actual supply/demand of capacity in a certain flight, and some other factors. The 
demand for air cargo capacity between an O-D pair fluctuates in a week. For example, 
some manufacturers require their suppliers to deliver raw materials before Sunday so 
that the production next week will not be delayed. As a result, the demand for the 
capacity will peak at the end of each week. The supply of capacity can also vary in a 
week. A large proportion of capacity comes from the belly space of passenger flights. 
The flight is usually more crowded during the weekends. Therefore, the supply of 
cargo capacity may drop in weekends. If such pattern in demand/supply exists, the 
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contract rate for different days of the week will vary. 
3. In our model, the contract rate is the same for different forwarders. Actually, however, 
different forwarders can have different contract rate for the same flight. Normally, the 
airline will classify forwarders into several tiers according to the importance of each 
forwarder. Tier 1 forwarders are usually required to commit a larger guaranteed 
capacity in each period than forwarders in other tiers. In return, tier 1 forwarders can 
enjoy lower contract rate. Likewise, tier 2 forwarders have to commit to larger 
guaranteed capacity and can enjoy lower contract rate than tier 3 forwarders. This 
business strategy results from the special characteristics in air cargo industry. On the 
one hand, most forwarders are only able to meet the capacity commitment 
requirement of one airline, due to the limited demand from shippers. Under this 
business strategy, forwarders will choose one airline as their major business partner. 
On the other hand, an airline can only accommodate several tier 1 forwarders, due to 
its limited capacity, especially its limited capacity in peak season. As a result, each 
airline can have several major customers. This business strategy can help airlines 
establish a relatively clear territory in the market, and thus, stabilize the air cargo 
industry and reduce the chance of chaos situations, such as price wars.  
From the above explanations, it is clear that the contract rates and order quantities 
obtained from the long-term capacity allocation model cannot be the final terms in 
guaranteed capacity agreements. Instead, the airline can use the result as a basis for the 
negotiation with forwarders. The final contract rates and order quantities also depend on 
the bargain power of players, the demand/capacity forecasting, relationship between the 
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airline and the forwarder, and also some long-term strategic considerations. Expert 
judgments should be involved when making long-term capacity allocation decisions, 
since the capacity allocation can be more art than science. 
5.2.2 Backlog or purchase additional capacity? 
The integrated capacity allocation model proposed in the previous section is based on the 
aggregate demand and capacity over a long period. Usually, the forecasting of future 
demand is unreliable. Even if the model is correct, the situations that some flights are too 
congested while others fly empty can still happens. As departure date approaches, more 
information becomes available and the airline may find that the capacity on a flight is not 
enough to satisfy demand. If so, the airline has to decide whether to backlog some cargo 
to the next flight or purchase additional capacity from spot market. These decisions are 
called capacity re-allocation in this thesis. There are three major cases in which the 
capacity re-allocation is needed.  
1. Order congestion on a certain flight. As explained above, the demand of capacity can 
vary from flight to flight. It is possible that the total demand on one flight is higher 
than the total capacity while the total demand on the next flight is considerably less 
than available capacity.  
2. Result of overbooking. To mitigate the effect of cancellations and no-shows, the 
airline usually accepts more demand than its capacity. This practice is known as 
overbooking. If the volume or weight of show-up cargos is larger than the airline’s 
capacity, re-allocation of capacity is needed.  
Chapter 5 Integration of the Short-Term and Long-Term RM Models 
89 
 
3. Unexpected high demand in spot market. It is possible that the ad hoc demand in a 
certain flight is unexpectedly high, and thus exceeds the total capacity on the flight 
less total guaranteed capacity. Since the spot rate is usually much higher than 
contract rate, the airline may make more profit if it is allowed to backlog some 
guaranteed demand to the next flight with reasonable cost and re-allocate more 
capacity to spot market. 
When making decision on capacity re-allocation in the first two situations discussed 
above, the airline has to balance the cost of backlogged cargos and the cost of 
purchasing additional capacity. Chew et al. (2006) considers a similar problem from 
forwarder’s perspective. They formulate the problem as a stochastic dynamic 
programming, which can provide the optimal decision on the amount of capacity 
repurchased and the amount of cargo backlogged. The model proposed in Chew et al. 
(2006) can be applied to solve our problem without major revision.  
If the non-guaranteed demand with high profit margin exceeds the remaining capacity, 
like the 3
rd
 situation described above, the problem will be more complex. The airline has 
to first decide whether the demand should be accepted before the decision on 
backlogging/repurchasing can be made. In real operations, the cost of backlog or 
additional capacity is very high. Therefore, the non-guaranteed demand has to be 
rejected in most cases.  
Gallego and Phillips (2004) discusses a special product in air cargo industry, called time-
definite product, in which the airline specifies only the pick-up time and delivery time 
rather than the specific flight. This type of products provides flexibility by allowing the 
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airline to allocate some cargos from a congested flight to a vacant flight as long as the 
pick-up time and delivery time are met. Time-definite product is only an existing 
example of flexible products in air cargo industry. More flexible products can be created 
to meet the industry’s need. For example, consider an airline with three flights from 
Singapore to Hong Kong in the first week of August. One departs on Monday, the 
second departs on Wednesday, and the third departs on Friday. Forwarders can book 
capacity on any flights. Besides the ordinary product, the airline can offer a flexible 
product at a discount. Forwarders who purchase the flexible product will get a certain 
amount of guaranteed capacity in the first week of August, but they would not be 
informed which flight until later. The airline will have the right to observe the demand in 
each flight and decide the allocation of flexible products accordingly. If properly 
designed, the flexible products can solve the problems discussed in this section and 
increase the expected revenue of the airline.   
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The main purpose of this thesis is to develop a revenue management system to help the 
airline allocate the capacity on both long-term contract market and spot market so as to 
maximize the total revenue. This chapter concludes the study by presenting a summary of 
research findings and discussing the implications and limitations of this research, as well 
as suggesting several directions for future research.  
6.1 Main findings 
In the first part of the thesis (chapter 3), we consider a single-leg air cargo booking 
control problem on the spot market. Air cargo booking requests arrives several days 
before departure on the spot market. When booking request arrives, the airline has to 
decide whether to accept the booking or reserve the capacity for a more profitable 
booking that may arrive in the future. The booking process is modeled as a discrete-time 
Markov chain and the decision on acceptance/rejection is based on a bid-price control 
policy. To avoid the complexity of high dimensionality, the bid prices are derived from 
maximizing a reward function of the Markov chain. Numerical experiments show that the 
proposed model outperforms two existing static single-leg air cargo booking control 
policies.  
In the second part of this thesis (chapter 4), we consider the long-term capacity allocation 
problem in air cargo industry. We assume that one major airline serves n forwarders in 
the industry. The airline and forwarders will close long-term contract several months in 
advance. The airline will decide the contract rate and the forwarder will decide the order 
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quantity in the contract. To mitigate the negative impact of seasonal imbalance between 
supply and demand, we propose a capacity bundling policy, in which the guaranteed 
capacity that each forwarder can get during the peak season depends on its order quantity 
during low seasons. Then, we model the problem as a Stackelberg game and the airline as 
the Stackelberg leader. For a general capacity bundling policy, the forwarder’s decision 
problem is modeled as a dynamic programming and the airline’s decision problem can be 
solved via numerical methods. Then, a commonly used linear form capacity bundling 
policy is assumed. Based on this assumption, the problem is decomposed into several 
sub-problems and the optimal solution is obtained. Numerical experiments show that the 
capacity bundling policy can increase the airline’s expected profit and reduce the risk, 
when the expected spot rate is less than forwarder’s resale rate in the peak season. The 
policy can have a stronger effect when the future demand is highly unpredictable. 
Therefore, the capacity bundling policy can successfully solve the mismatch between 
capacity supply and demand in air cargo industry.  
In the third part of this thesis (chapter 5), we propose a conceptual framework of a 
revenue management system for air cargo capacity allocation. The two capacity control 
model developed in chapter 3 and 4 are interrelated. The capacity allocation decision in 
the long-term contract market will affect the available capacity in spot market. The 
opportunity cost of capacity on spot market, in turn, affects the decision on long-term 
capacity allocation. In view of the relationship between the two models, we propose an 
integrated model that can jointly allocate capacity between spot market and contract 
market. The integrative capacity allocation can be obtained by solving the two models 
iteratively and repeatedly. Then, we highlight two issues in using the proposed air cargo 
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revenue management system. The first issue is how to make use of the “optimal” contract 
rate obtained from the model. The airline should view the contract rate as a basis and 
guideline for the negotiation with forwarders when signing the long-term contract. The 
actual contract rates and order quantities will depend on the bargain power, the 
demand/capacity forecasting, relationship between the airline and the forwarder, and also 
some long-term strategic considerations. Expert judgments should be involved when 
making long-term capacity allocation decisions. The second issue that needs our 
attentions is the case when the airline faces shortage of capacity to satisfy all guaranteed 
demands. In such a situation, the airline has to decide the capacity that should be 
purchased from spot market and the quantity of cargo that should be backlogged, so that 
the total cost is maximized. We suggest that the model developed in Chew et al. (2006) 
can be used to solve this problem. We also suggest the airline design flexible products for 
air cargo transportation so that the capacity can be used more efficiently. 
6.2 Suggestion for future research 
Competing behavior among airlines 
The air cargo industry considered in this thesis consists of one major airline and several 
forwarders. Therefore, the airline has strong power in the product pricing. This may be 
true for the spot market, in which the customers often act as price takers. However, the 
airline may not have such strong influence on the cargo rate in contract market since it 
may face the competition from other airlines. During the low season, especially on some 
route where overcapacity exists, some airlines may charge a very low contract rate, which 
can only cover its operating cost to attract demands and keep a good relationship with 
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forwarders. In such a situation, other airlines may not have strong bargain power and 
need to consider the strategic behaviors from its competitors.  
Moreover, airlines may focus on the long-term benefits from the strategic behaviors 
rather than maximizing the revenue in a single decision period. For example, if airline A 
has dominating power in a certain market, it may start a price war and try to wipe out 
other competing airlines. The short-term performance of the airline may be very poor 
under this strategy, but the long-term benefits may be maximized. In contrast, the airlines 
in a market may try to maintain a stable contract rate and form a relative clear market 
territory. By doing so, every airline may survive and make profit in the long run. 
In summary, the complex strategic behaviors of all airlines need special analysis when 
making decisions on capacity allotment in a competitive market. Game theory may be 
needed to analyze the problem and the proof on the existence and uniqueness of the 
equilibrium may be necessary.  
Multiple tiers of customer 
In this thesis, we assume that the contract rate is the same for all customers. Actually, 
however, different forwarders can have different contract rate for the same flight. 
Normally, the airline will classify the forwarders into several tiers according to the 
importance of each forwarder. Tier 1 forwarders are usually required to commit a larger 
guaranteed capacity in each period than forwarders in other tiers. In return, tier 1 
forwarders can enjoy lower contract rate. This business strategy is not useful when one 
major airline serves the entire market, as assumed in our thesis. However, it will be very 
important for airlines operating in a competing market. The airlines that can attract big 
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shippers and forwarders will have stronger power in pricing the product and have greater 
chance to survive. Then, the research question is how to set the contract rate and 
minimum capacity commitment for each tier of customer so that the sales target is 
achieved. When making the above decision, the airline should consider not only the 
demand/supply relationship in the market but also strategic behaviors from its 
competitors. Also, the airline should not merely focus on maximizing the short-term 
revenue but on maximizing the long run interests. It will be very helpful for the airline if 
future research can solve this problem successfully.  
Relationship between contract market and spot market 
There are three types of demand/supply shift between contract market and spot market. 
1. The more the forwarder orders in the long-term contract market, the less the 
chance that it cannot satisfy all demands and need to purchase additional capacity 
from spot market. Therefore, part of the potential demand in the spot market shift 
to the contract market. Vice versa.  
2. If the forwarder orders a lot in the contract market but cannot sell out all the 
guaranteed capacity, it may sell the remaining capacity at spot price to other 
forwarders requiring emergency capacity. Therefore, part of the supply may shift 
from the contract market to the spot market.  
3. The problem will be more complicated when considering the competing behavior 
from other airlines. Suppose two airlines operating in a region, A and B. If airline 
B allocates a large amount of capacity to the contract market and market 
aggressively, airline A will face strong competition in the contract market. 
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However, airline B will provide less capacity to spot market. If airline B commits 
more guaranteed capacity than it can provide, airline B can be the potential 
customer on spot market. Airline A can adjust its pricing strategy according to B’s 
strategic behavior.  
The demand/supply shift introduced above is not considered in this thesis. The 
demand/supply shift is based on the strategic behavior of forwarders and other competing 
airlines. To model such behavior the airline has to possess accurate information on 
forwarders’ and other airlines’ forecasting of future demand. Therefore, the analysis on 
the demand/supply shift between contract market and spot market should be based on the 
advance of information sharing in the air cargo industry. 
Non-constant arrival rate λ in spot market 
In chapter 3, the arrival rate of demand λ is assumed to be a constant throughout the 
selling season. However, it is expected that the arrival rate depends on the amount of time 
before departure. As the time approaches the departure, the demand rate may increase. 
Therefore, a more realistic assumption is that the arrival of demand follows a non-
homogeneous Poisson process and the arrival rate is a function of time λ(t). One possible 
way to incorporate the time-dependent arrival rate into the proposed Markovian model is 
to use several homogeneous Poisson process with different λ to approximate the non-
homogeneous Poisson process. For example, suppose the selling season starts 10 days 
before the departure, and the airline estimates the arrival rate function λ(t) during the 
selling season. It is natural to assume that the arrival rate remains constant within each 
day. Denote the arrival rates as      10,...,2,1  . Then, the capacity control problem 
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during the 10 days can be decomposed into 10 sub-problems, and each problem has 
similar characteristics as the capacity control problem considered in chapter 3. Similar as 
in chapter 3, define process   NnVWS nn ,...,0,,  , where nW  and nV  are the total 
accepted weight and volume until period n. At the beginning of the selling season, the 
state of process S is known. Then, according to equation (3.16), the end state of process S 
in day 1 can be predicted, and it is a function of bid prices wh  and vh . Also, the total 
expected revenue received in the first day can be predicted based on lemma 2. At the 
beginning of second day in selling season, the state of process S is the end state of 
process S in day 1. Based on the arrival rate  2 , the state evolvement and the expected 
revenue in day 2 can be predicted. Following this way, the expected revenue in each day 
can be predicted and the sum of all revenue will give us the total expected revenue from 
the flight. Numerical searching algorithms can be used to find the optimal bid prices.  
Besides the time before the departure, the arrival rate may also depend on other factors, 
such as the spot rate on the market and the competing strategy of other airlines. By 
incorporating these factors into the model, the capacity control model can better reflect 
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